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Introduction 
The Dutch East India Company (VOC) sent thousands of reports back to the United Provinces 
of the Netherlands, or patria. These reports ranged from salary rolls to diplomatic letters from 
native rulers to an overview of the costs of dredging the river of Batavia.1 Many of these reports 
had cartographic material attached, but few books in the VOC archives residing in the National 
Archives in The Hague have as many maps as the journal of Governor Gerrit de Heere, which 
contains 23 maps of various types. There are two extant copies, one in the VOC Archive of the 
National Archives and one in the Special Collections of the Leiden University Library.  
The journal is a daily register of the activities and decisions made by Governor De Heere 
during his inspection tour around Sri Lanka, then Dutch Ceylon, in 1698. Because of the 
location and the time period, these activities and decisions, as well as the reflections upon them 
that De Heere provides in the text, can tell us much about the policies of the VOC on Sri Lanka, 
as well as the VOC in general. Besides this, the abundance of cartographic material, of which 
more than half concerns fortifications, can allow us insights into historical cartography and the 
nature of fortifications in Asia. The historiographical analysis below will therefore have to be 
split in four; as the angles of approaching this source also number four.  
Historiography 
To start, let us look at the debates concerning the VOC as a whole in the late seventeenth 
century. While there is some debate on when the decline of the VOC started, there is consensus 
that the last few decades of the seventeenth century were a time of crisis and reconfiguration. 
After the war of 1672-1678 and decades of increased pressure on the trade of the Dutch 
Republic by the mercantilist policies of France, England and Sweden, the Dutch economy 
                                                 
1 There are around one hundred maps accompanying these reports or sent without such a report in the Collection 
Leupe (4.VEL) at the National Archives in The Hague. An example of a map like this and the report it 
accompanied: National Archives The Hague, Collectie Kaarten Leupe, 4.VEL, inventory number 388A; National 
Archives The Hague, Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), 1.04.02, inv. nr. 1750 fol. 698-707.  
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needed to adapt to survive.2 Within this situation, the VOC faced a similar issue: prices were 
falling and they had to change course or fall to the pressures of the French and especially the 
English East India Companies.3 This debate plays only a small role in this thesis, but it is 
important to point out that there was a certain amount of pressure on the VOC in the late 
seventeenth century to understand their policies on Sri Lanka.   
The other debate concerning the VOC that this thesis can contribute to is that of the VOC 
as a state versus the VOC as a merchant. Whereas traditionally the VOC was described mostly 
as a merchant company, recently historians have favoured the viewpoint that it was a state. A 
good historiographic overview of the traditional emphasis on the VOC as a mercantile company 
can be found in Jur van Goor’s introduction to De Verenigde Oost-Indische compagnie tussen 
oorlog en diplomatie.4 This volume was important in redefining the VOC as a state instead of 
purely a merchant, which is now commonly accepted as a valid way to interpret the VOC. 5   
I favour the interpretation of Arthur Weststeijn, who sees the VOC as a Company-State, 
with some adaptation.6 In his article, he focuses on the debates contemporaries had about the 
nature of the VOC. It becomes clear that even in the time of the VOC the nature of the Company 
was called into question along similar lines as historians debate it now. It is precisely this idea 
which leads me to the lens through which I wish to approach this debate. In my mind, the VOC 
was in fact both a mercantile company and a state, but it should be seen as a spectrum on which 
it moved. This movement was caused by VOC officials. Individuals such as the famous 
Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen and Rijckloff van Goens, discussed below, tried to pull 
                                                 
2 Jonathan I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740 (Oxford 1989) 292-358, Jan de Vries and Annet 
M. van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, failure and perseverance of the Dutch economy, 1500-
1815 (Cambridge 1997) 673-680. 
3 Ibidem 677. 
4 Jurrien van Goor, “De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in de historiografie. Imperialist en multinational.”, 
in: Gerrit Knaap and Ger Teitler (eds.), De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tussen oorlog en diplomatie 
(Leiden 2002) 9–33. 
5 For example: Gerrit Knaap, De ‘Core Business’ van de VOC: Markt, macht en mentaliteit vanuit overzees 
perspectief (inaugural lecture, Utrecht 2015). 
6 Arthur Weststeijn, “The VOC as a Company-State: Debating Seventeenth-Century Dutch Colonial Expansion” 
Itenario 38 1 (2014) 13-34. 
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the Company further towards empire, while their critics attempted to pull it back into the 
mercantile end. By providing this context through secondary sources, we can use the journal of 
De Heere as a measurement of these changes by the late seventeenth century. Both this 
historical context as well as the historiographical debates around it will be further explored in 
Chapter 1. 
This first chapter will also discuss the history of the Dutch on Sri Lanka. The tension 
between mercantile and territorial ambitions will be discussed through the character of the 
aforementioned Rijckloff van Goens. This man was the primary force behind policy on Sri 
Lanka before, during, and after his tenure (1660-1661, 1663, 1664-1675) as Governor of that 
island – when he was promoted to Governor-General in Batavia (1678-1681), his son took over 
as Governor of Ceylon. This – combined with his particular stance on VOC policies towards 
Sri Lanka – makes him a good subject to focus on for that period of Sri Lankan history, which 
is essential to understanding De Heere’s journal.  
Unfortunately, the literature on Dutch Ceylon is limited compared to that on, say, the Dutch 
East Indies. While Van Goens is a well-studied figure and his period of operation has been 
examined thoroughly – though one must rely in large part on the work of Sinnappah 
Arasaratnam – the period between his departure and the governance of Governor Gustaaf 
Willem van Imhoff is much less covered. It is telling that in the History of Sri Lanka the chapters 
on Van Goens’ period and the period after have widely different timespans. Arasaratnam’s 
chapter on the consolidation of Dutch power spans from 1658 until 1687, a period of 29 years 
where he focuses in large part on Van Goens and his son Rijckloff van Goens Jr. The following 
chapter by Don Ariyapala Kotelawele covers the period 1688-1766, or 78 years. Within this 
chapter, he spends some time discussing the criticisms raised against Van Goens and the 
resulting policy shifts, but summarizes the period of 1687-1696 in one paragraph, after which 
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he skips to the late 1730s.7 This dearth in secondary literature will of course not be sufficiently 
filled with just this thesis, but perhaps it is a start. There is, however, enough coverage by the 
secondary literature to at least contextualize the source discussed here.  
The field of cartographic history is similarly badly covered. The studies published in this 
field mostly fall into the category of cartobibliographic works such as Maps and Plans of Dutch 
Ceylon8 or The Comprehensive Atlas of the VOC.9 Kees Zandvliet’s seminal Mapping for 
Money is an excellent analysis of the cartographic machine of the VOC but is rather general in 
its approach.10 It is a good starting point, but more, detailed studies are necessary. Using maps 
as primary sources for analysis is even less common, especially with the kind of questions I 
will be raising. I intend to use the maps in this journal not as a decorative element but as an 
integral part of the source. While I will not interpret them as reflections of culture and social 
structures like Brian Harley proposed,11 I intend to show they can reflect the intentions of the 
mapmaker, in this case Johan Christiaanszoon Toorzee, and his superior, here Governor De 
Heere. This, then, allows us to come to a better understanding of VOC policies and the way the 
officials of the VOC came to these policies. This should show the value of cartographic material 
for historical research.  
To do this, I make a distinction between two purposes of maps within the context of the 
VOC. While I will not comment on other cartographic material, as that is beyond the scope of 
this study, these two purposes can be used to categorize maps sent to patria by VOC personnel. 
The two categories I have devised are decorative and illustrative.  
                                                 
7 D. A. Kotelawele, ‘The VOC in Sri Lanka 1688-1766: Problems and Policies’, in: K. M. de Silva (ed.), History 
of Sri Lanka Vol. II 1500-1800 (Sri Lanka 1995) 233-280, there 238. 
8 K. D. Paranavitana and R. K. de Silva, Maps and Plans of Dutch Ceylon: A representative collection of 
cartography from the Dutch period (Colombo 2002).  
9 The volume on Ceylon: J.R. van Diessen, B. Nelemans, R. Robson-McKillop and Sri Lanka National Archives, 
Grote Atlas van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: / Comprehensive Atlas of the Dutch East India Company: 
Deel IV: / Volume IV: Ceylon (Voorburg 2008) 
10 Kees Zandvliet, Mapping for Money: Maps, plans and topographic paintings and their role in Dutch overseas 
expansion during the 16th and 17th centuries (Amsterdam 1998). 
11 Brian Harley, The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography (Baltimore 2001) 36.  
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When maps are meant to be decorative, they serve only to show an area, mostly for the sake 
of it. That is not to say there is no ‘subtext’, as it were: Even if a map does not directly serve an 
argument, it still primes the reader to think in a certain way. When the purpose is to be 
illustrative, however, a map directly supports an argument. To use a modern-day analogy, the 
map a historian might put on the cover of his book is usually strictly decorative. A map of Sri 
Lanka on the cover of this thesis would not argue for anything. It would, however, prime the 
reader: This is a thesis dealing with Sri Lanka.  
On the other hand, a map showing the trade routes used in a given area might illustrate the 
importance of the port the historian is examining. If I put a map in this thesis showing all the 
trade routes of the VOC that stopped at Sri Lanka, I would be using this map to directly argue 
that Sri Lanka was an important centre of trade. Of course, the distinction would be arbitrary if 
used as absolute categories. The cartographic material is on a spectrum; even a map that is not 
mentioned in the text might say something about what the author is trying to bring across by 
contextualizing the area he is talking about.  
One category of maps tends to be more illustrative than not: fortification plans. There are 
many of these in the journal of De Heere, which allows for an examination of fortifications in 
Asia. This, too, is a subject which historians have not written nearly as much about as could be 
and should be done. Generally speaking, European forts are examined within the context of 
Europe.12 Geoffrey Parker famously saw the new European forts as initiating the military 
revolution. 13 He saw them as the “engine” of European expansion across the world, in the sense 
that they allowed Europeans to actually hold on to territories and also forced them to continue 
to invest in areas where they settled.14  
                                                 
12 For example: G. Bukal, 'Prussian starforts in the 18th century', Fort 39 (2011) 3-56 and B.H. St. J. O'Neill, 
Castles and Cannon: Study of Early Artillery Fortifications in England (Oxford 1960). 
13 G. Parker, The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge 1996). 
14 Idem, 'The artillery fortress as an engine of European overseas expansion, 1480-1750', in: J.D. Tracy (ed.), City 
Walls: The Urban Enceinte in Global Perspective (Cambridge 2000) 386-416, there 389-393.   
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The developments of these fortifications and the responses thereto have been studied, but 
the effect of these developments in Asia is much less apparent. Parker’s comments on their role 
in European expansion are not explored well by him or later authors. There has been more 
attention for European military operations in Asia recently, but they often are too generalist or 
focus solely on the eighteenth century or later.15 Erik Odegard is currently finalizing a 
monograph which examines this phenomenon in depth, but it remains unpublished.16 Books 
and articles which do examine fortifications in Asia tend to be either examinations of particular 
forts, or summaries of a series of forts.17 Recently, the Stichting Menno van Coehoorn published 
a book on Dutch fortifications overseas, combining a few general chapters on forts in Asia and 
“the West” with examinations of specific fortresses, such as Chapter 3’s Fort Nassau on the 
Gold Coast by Hans van Westing.18 This is a good start, but much is to be done. 
Another issue with the literature on these forts is that it is often written not by historians, 
but by architects and archaeologists. They are, obviously, good at what they do, but it does not 
help us if we want to have historical context for these forts. An example of an architect writing 
on Dutch fortifications in Asia is Ron van Oers, who tried to categorize Dutch towns overseas 
but did so based on architectural characteristics rather than their historical context.19 I will 
elaborate further on this in Chapter 4, where classifications of forts will be directly relevant.20 
                                                 
15 Gurbir Mansigh, French Military Influence in India (New Delhi 2006) focuses on the eighteenth century. Gerrit 
Knaap, Henk den Heijer and Michiel de Jong, Oorlogen Overzee: Militair optreden door compagnie en staat 
buiten Europa (Amsterdam 2015) is very generalist and rather descriptive.   
16 Erik Odegard, Untitled Monograph on European Forts in Asia (Unpublished).  
17 Examples of specific fortifications: Erik Odegard, “Designing a New Fort on the Gold Coast: Johan Fredrik 
Trenks, the WIC, and the New Fort at Takoradi, 1774–1791”, Itinerario 40:3 (2016) 523-547. A comparative study 
is offered by I. Nirmalagiri, I., St. Angelo and Bekal fortresses – a comparative study (unpublished PhD thesis, 
Kannur University 2010), but it remains focused on only two forts.  
A very important book on fortifications on Sri Lanka is W. A. Nelson, The Dutch Forts of Sri Lanka: The military 
monuments of Ceylon (Edinburgh 1984). This work is very short and descriptive but does provide a good summary 
of the Dutch forts on the island.  
18 K. A. Ampt, K., A. Littel and E. Paar (eds.) Verre forten, vreemde kusten : Nederlandse verdedigingswerken 
overzee (Leiden 2017). 
19 Ron van Oers, Dutch Town Planning overseas during VOC and WIC rule (1600-1800) (Zutphen 2000). 
20 One other example of an architectural work on fortifications on Sri Lanka that I cannot neglect to mention is 
D.P. Chandrasekara, Architectural Heritage of Sri Lanka: Fortifications Along the Kelani River (Colombo 2012). 
Unfortunately, it is not directly relevant to my thesis because De Heere did not visit the smaller forts along the 
Kelani river.  
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Archaeologists examine the remains of the fort, which can be useful to be sure, but cannot 
provide all the answers a historian might ask, especially for earlier periods.  
Methodology 
The present thesis, then, provides some insights in four different fields and nestles itself in 
lacunae in each, though not each of these is the same size. I do not wish to imply that this thesis 
can fully fill any of these gaps; but it can make a start and provide an example of the research 
that can be done with this kind of material.  
Specifically, I want to elucidate what the purpose was of De Heere’s inspection described 
in this journal, how this relates to the situation on Sri Lanka specifically and the VOC in a wider 
sense, and what role the maps in the journal play in this. Along the way, I will also strive to add 
to the historiography of cartography and fortifications in Asia.  
It is precisely because my thesis nestles in the gaps of four different debates that I will focus 
solely on one source. Most historical studies approach one subject from multiple sources, but 
doing the opposite has its own benefits. By focusing on this one source, the interplay between 
these various historiographic debates becomes clear. The downside, of course, is that I will have 
to rely on secondary literature to contextualize the findings in this study. As Philip Pomper 
pointed out concerning the reliance on secondary sources by historians who study world history, 
this “evokes disapproval among guild members, for whom only direct scrutiny of documents 
validates the status of historians.”21 Perhaps this is the result of the Cartesian anxiety that 
Richard J. Bernstein points out in his Beyond Objectivism and Relativism.22 In an attempt to 
find some basis on which we can uphold the idea of truth within history writing, historians latch 
onto primary sources as the utmost important measure. It is my opinion that, as long as proper 
care is taken to be self-consciously aware and reflect on whether we are being objective, it is 
                                                 
21 Philip Pomper, “World History and Its Critics”, in: History and Theory 34 2 (1995) 1-7, there 2.  
22 Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia 
1983), 1-37, there 18-19.  
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possible to rely on secondary sources for information, especially when contextualizing a 
primary source.23 
In Chapter 1 I will provide the immaterial context of the diary, in the sense that I will 
explicate the administrative structure and historical context in which it was created. The focus 
will be on the relationship of the Directors, Batavia and the Ceylon office; the long-term history 
of the Ceylon office and its relationship with Kandy; and the direct historical context on both 
the broader Dutch and VOC level, as well as the specific Ceylonese level.  
Chapter 2 will explicate the material context of the diary: why are there two copies, how 
did these copies come to be in the places they are, but explanation will also be given of the 
material contents of the journal, such as the nature of the cartographic material. The chapter 
will also explore the textual contents of the journal, focusing on those parts of the text that do 
not interact with the cartographic material.   
In the third chapter, I will focus on two kinds of maps in the journal. The overview maps 
and land survey maps examined in this chapter will explicate my distinction between decorative 
and illustrative maps rather well. They will also provide insights on the purpose of De Heere’s 
inspection journey.  
The final chapter will focus on fortification maps and the changing role of fortifications on 
Sri Lanka by the time of De Heere. This should provide insights both into the fortification 
debate in itself, as well as showing the changing considerations of VOC policy makers on Sri 
Lanka. 
  
                                                 
23 For an excellent reflective article on reliance on secondary sources, see Janet Abu-Lughod, “The World-System 
Perspective in the Construction of Economic History”, in: History and Theory 34 2 (1995) 86-98. The emphasis 
on self-conscious awareness and reflexivity she adopted from Gadamar, as can be read on page 92 of that article.  
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Chapter 1 – A Mighty Island 
Sri Lanka was often called the “Mighty Island of Ceylon”. This chapter will elaborate on the 
historical context of the VOC in general and Sri Lanka specifically. Contextualizing the position 
Governor De Heere was in is important to understanding the inspection journey he made and 
the paperwork it produced. The goal is to assess the situation in the final years of the seventeenth 
century situation by examining what came before, so that I can provide the policy points which 
would be of importance to De Heere and what this means in the context of the merchant-state 
spectrum. As pointed out before, the goal of this thesis is to use De Heere’s journal as a snapshot 
of the situation at the end of the seventeenth century, but without the context of what came 
before there would be nothing to compare it to.   
 The chapter is divided into three sections. I will start with a general overview of the 
position of Ceylon in the VOC apparatus, as well as a short history of the initial Dutch incursion 
into Sri Lanka. The second section will discuss the impact of Rijckloff Volckertszoon van 
Goens and, to a lesser extent, his son of the same name. Van Goens is not only interesting 
because of his large impact on the history of Dutch Ceylon, but also because his career shows 
the (potential) importance of Ceylon to the VOC as a whole as well as the reasons why the 
course was changed after Van Goens retired. This plays directly into the aforementioned 
merchant-state spectrum on which I argue the VOC moved, as Van Goens was adamantly on 
the state side and his critics on the merchant side. The third section will deal with the history of 
the VOC in general in the late seventeenth century. Much of what is decided about Ceylon is 
informed by the course of VOC policy in general. The chapter will end with a summary of what 
has been discussed in the form of the aforementioned policies I expect to find in the journal of 
De Heere’s inspection tour. 
10 
 
Ceylon and its position in the VOC   
In 1638 the VOC signed a treaty with King Rajasimha II detailing the conditions under which 
the Dutch would cooperate in the expulsion of the Portuguese from Sri Lanka. Significantly, 
the treaty stipulated that captured Portuguese forts would be garrisoned by the Dutch or 
demolished. The additional clause “as the King sees fit” was only present in the Singhalese 
version of the treaty, not the Dutch one.24 The other justification the Dutch used for their 
occupation of the coast was that the king of Kandy, who technically owned the land, was 
supposed to reimburse the Company for costs incurred while removing the Portuguese from the 
island. Seeing as it was impossible for the king to actually pay this debt, they kept the lands as 
security.25 Femme Gaastra disputes Sinnappah Arasaratnam’s assertion that this debt never 
shrunk – the Dutch records lowered the debt by the theoretical price paid for cinnamon extracted 
from Ceylon, though this was not the actual profit gained from this spice – but he, too, agrees 
that the king would never be able to pay the enormous debt the Dutch accorded him.26  
The tensions caused by the weak legal foundations of the Dutch occupation of the Sri 
Lankan lowlands made the Dutch-Kandyan alliance rather shaky. When the Dutch took 
Colombo in 1656 and fortified it, the alliance broke down. After this and other diplomatic 
breaches, King Rajasimha responded with armed force: on multiple occasions his forces 
systematically devastated swathes of land on the western and southern frontiers and many of 
the locals were removed from the Dutch-occupied lands.27 This displacement disrupted the 
cinnamon production, which was the main purpose of the Dutch entry into Sri Lanka.  
                                                 
24 S. Arasaratnam, ‘Dutch sovereignty in Ceylon: a historical survey of its problems’, Ceylon Journal of 
Historical and Social Studies I (Peradeniya 1958), as printed in S. Arasaratnam, Ceylon and the Dutch, 1600-
1800 (Hampshire 1996) 106.  
25 Ibidem 109, 11-112 and idem, ‘The Consolidation of Dutch Power in the Maritime Regions 1658-1687’, in: K. 
M. de Silva (ed.), History of Sri Lanka Vol. II 1500-1800 (Sri Lanka 1995) 211-232, there 212-213.  
26 F.S. Gaastra, Bewind en Beleid bij de VOC: De financiële en commerciële politiek van de bewindhebbers, 
1672-1702 (Zutphen 1989) 72. 
27 Arasaratnam, ‘Consolidation of Dutch Power’ 212.  
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This cinnamon trade was very profitable and a large part of what made Ceylon a very 
important office to the VOC in itself. According to both overview tables provided in Gaastra’s 
seminal work Bewind en Beleid bij de VOC, Ceylon accounts for roughly 20% of the expenses 
made by the VOC in Asia, and roughly 10% of the income.28 On the side of expenses, no other 
office besides Batavia comes close, with Malabar at 6.8% in the period 1670-1680 coming 
closest.29 
There are some remarks to be made about these figures. It is important to note that Ceylon 
acted as a sort of secondary rendezvous besides Batavia. Many of the ships coming from the 
various establishments of the VOC in India passed through Ceylon, which figures into the 
expenses of the office. Also, while the expenses of the nearby Cochin possessions were counted 
as part of Ceylon’s balance, any income derived from these places was not.30 An important 
aspect of the way income was usually calculated is that the cinnamon income was based on a 
set price of 2 stuivers per pound, while the price in Europe, for which it was actually sold, varied 
between 3 and 5 guilders per pound. This amounts to profits which were 30 to 50 times the 
income cited in the books.31 As such, Ceylon was much more profitable than implied by these 
tables.32  
One of the most important sources for Gaastra’s work was Johannes Hudde, a mayor of 
Amsterdam (1672-1704) and a mathematician. Hudde was a part of the commission headed by 
secretary of the VOC Pieter van Dam, which was assigned in 1683 to redress “matters in the 
Indies and in this country”.33 Hudde was one of the most active members of this commission 
of redress and left many reports in a collection which lies in the National Archives in The 
                                                 
28 For the period 1670-1680: Gaastra, Bewind en Beleid 81. For the period 1684-1694: ibidem, 214 
29 Ibidem 81. Also of interest might be Kristof Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic trade, 1620-1740 (The Hague 1981), in 
which Glamann looks at the trade in specific goods throughout the specified period. 
30 Gaastra, Bewind en Beleid 216-221.  
31 Erik Odegard, Colonial Careers: Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, Rijckloff Volckertz. Van Goens and 
Career-Making in the Early Modern Dutch Empire (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Leiden University 2018) 178.  
32 Gaastra, Bewind en Beleid 216-221.  
33 Ibidem 19. 
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Hague.34 He is also a good example of one of the VOC officials who were firmly on the 
mercantile end of the spectrum, emphasizing trade and criticising Van Goens’ territorialism.  
Hudde made a different calculation of the income and expenses of Ceylon, though he too 
was not consistent in counting both income and expenses when adding smaller offices to 
Ceylon. He added the income and expenses of the Tuticorin office to the Ceylon office in his 
overview but neglected to add the income of the textile exported from it to Ceylon. He 
emphasized the fact that Ceylon was a secondary rendezvous as well, and in that he was more 
generous towards Ceylon than most who made calculations like these.  
Significantly for the point made in this section, he also added that there were some benefits 
to holding Sri Lanka that could not be easily expressed in numbers: it accorded great prestige 
among other European nations and had good resupply ports. The island also had a significant 
strategic importance, especially for the Indian possessions of the VOC. In the words of Hudde: 
“God forbid that Ceylon would fall in other European hands.”35 On the other hand, Hudde was 
part of the group who did not believe it was prudent to have a large territorial commitment in 
Ceylon.36 It is clear, then, that even for those like Hudde who favoured the merchant side of the 
merchant-state spectrum, it was important to keep other Europeans out of Sri Lanka. However, 
it was also important to them to reduce the costs incurred by the Ceylon office, which is 
reflected in the journal of De Heere, as will become clear in the following chapters. This focus 
on commercial endeavours over state-building differed significantly from the main figure of 
the following section. 
The Territorial Ambitions of Van Goens 
The most important figure of Dutch Ceylon in much of the latter half of the seventeenth century 
was Rijcklof van Goens. An able military man with a strong personality, he was responsible for 
                                                 
34 Ibidem 20.  
35 Ibidem 220. 
36 Odegard, Colonial Careers 189. 
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removing the Portuguese from the island and southern India around 1656. In the next few 
decades his career revolved around Ceylon and he dominated the VOC’s policy on the island, 
first as superintendent, then as governor, and finally as governor-general in Batavia with his 
son succeeding him on Sri Lanka. The reason Van Goens is so interesting is that he is focused 
on so much in the historiography of Sri Lanka, whereas the period after him, in which De 
Heere’s journal was written, is much more under lighted. Van Goens is also a prime example 
of a VOC official who wanted the VOC to be a state more than a merchant company. The 
competition between him and his critics exemplifies this debate.37 
Van Goens started his career as an orphan under the patronage of his uncle, Boyckes 
Rijckloff van Goens, who got him his first job as an assistant to the governor of Coromandel. 
Van Goens then made it back to Batavia and spent some years doing diplomatic missions within 
the Indonesian archipelago. These appointments gave him important experience in diplomacy 
and, according to Odegard, shaped Van Goens’ views on how the VOC should operate within 
Asia. In 1654, Van Goens was appointed to be the commander of the homeward-bound fleet. 
This brief stay in patria is important to understanding the way Van Goens was able to 
circumvent the High Government in Batavia later. Van Goens spent his time in the United 
Provinces making connections with the directors of the Company, gaining their trust. As the 
commander of the retourvloot, Van Goens was also expected to provide a report on the state of 
the Company’s possessions in Asia. In this report, we can already see his ambitions for the 
VOC as a state in Asia, and especially his intentions for Ceylon: “I am of the opinion that with 
God’s help it is possible to beat the Portuguese off of the island in two years, if only a thousand 
soldiers are added to those already there.”38 
                                                 
37 What follows is a summary of Van Goens’ career path until 1655, based primarily on the doctoral thesis of 
Erik Odegard. In this thesis, Odegard spends much time on explaining how Van Goens progressed through this 
career, but as that is not always relevant here, especially for the early stage of his career, I have chosen to leave 
much of this out. Odegard, Colonial Careers Chapter 3.  
38 P. A. van Leupe, ‘Rapport Van Goens’, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-
Indië, 4de Deel, 1ste/2de Afl. (1855) 149 non vide, as cited in Odegard, Colonial Careers 88.  
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In 1657 Van Goens arrived again in Asia at the head of a fleet. He had been appointed as 
commissaris en veldoverste in the South Asian commands, which placed him above the local 
governors and commanders in the hierarchy.39 Therefore, though there was a governor of 
Ceylon, Adrian van der Meijden, Van Goens was the primary force driving policy on Sri Lanka. 
After conquering most of the Portuguese possessions in South Asia and removing the 
Portuguese from the island, he undermined Van der Meijden whenever he could.40 In 1664 he 
was appointed as governor of Ceylon.  
The Supreme Government in Batavia was not enthused by the extent of territorial – and 
therefore financial – commitment in Sri Lanka. Batavia instructed the officials on the island to 
keep the peace with the king and attempt to maintain good relations. By 1664, after mounting 
pressure from European competition – especially by the English East India Company – Batavia 
relented and instructed Van Goens, now returning to Sri Lanka as Governor, to take the eastern 
ports of Batticalao and Trincomalee.41 These forts were taken and still under VOC control when 
De Heere did his inspection 34 years later. In a stroke of luck, internal struggles started in 
Kandy, providing an opportunity which the Dutch eagerly took to double their territory by 1670. 
The toll of this increased presence was an increasing number of troops required from Batavia. 
At the time, though, the Supreme Government was receiving requests for additional military 
support from many of the offices in South East Asia as well. Many quarters were territorially 
expanding, and as such, Batavia was hard pressed. For this reason, the High Council in Batavia 
tried to curb expansion in Sri Lanka; the ports and even the coastline if necessary were 
considered of importance, but the incursions deeper into the highlands were discouraged.42 
Normally, the Ceylon office was expected to follow these instructions, being subordinate 
to the Supreme Government. Van Goens, however, manipulated the flow of information to push 
                                                 
39 Odegard, Colonial Careers 127-128. 
40 Ibidem 130-131. 
41 Ibidem 215-217. 
42 Ibidem 219-220.  
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through his own views. As mentioned before, he had spent time in the United Provinces 
building connections with the Directors. In 1665 he started sending ships with letters and reports 
directly to the Republic instead of via Batavia, which allowed him to control the narrative.43 
Combining his connections in the patria with this control of information and his reputation as a 
military commander and diplomat, Van Goens was able to gain the support of the Directors 
even in the face of criticism from Batavia. The narrative he pushed, partly based on one-sided 
and misleading evidence, was that Kandy was a dying state and the Dutch were in a prime 
position to take the entire island.44 This was part of Van Goens’ personal ambition to make Sri 
Lanka the centre of Dutch operations in Asia instead of Batavia. This ambition was partly 
because of his love for the island – he named his daughter Esther Ceylonia van Goens45 – and 
partly because he was of the opinion that the VOC should behave as a state. He thought it would 
be more than possible to use taxation to pay for the costs of this occupation.46 This plan was 
also, however, based on a severe underestimation of Kandyan resilience.  
Under the initial pretext of defending king Rajasimha against the rebels he was facing, 
Dutch troops invaded the Kandyan territories in 1665. Even then Batavia protested, but Van 
Goens moved forward anyway, knowing the Directors would back him up. Soon, the pretences 
of defending Rajasimha were abandoned and it was made clear Dutch occupation was 
permanent, which Batavia disagreed with even more.47 The Directors in the Netherlands, 
however, continued to rely on Van Goens’ judgement, who presented the successful Kandyan 
counterattack in 1670 as dissidents opposed to both the VOC and king Rajasimha, despite this 
attack being quite clearly an operation of the latter.48 
                                                 
43 Odegard, Colonial Careers 140.  
44 S. Arasaratnam, Dutch Power in Ceylon, 1658-1687 (Amsterdam 1958) 46-49.  
45 Odegard, Colonial Careers 121.  
46 Arasaratnam, ‘Consolidation of Dutch Power’ 221. 
47 Ibidem 218-223. 
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The VOC officials on Ceylon started to voice criticism towards Van Goens in the 1670s, 
though, and the attack by Rajasimha cast doubts on Van Goens’ narrative. Two years later, 
however, the war with France and England in Europe broke out and Van Goens was once again 
made superintendent, admiraal en veldoverste – that is, superintendent, admiral and supreme 
commander – in South Asia. His son, Rijckloff van Goens Jr., took over the governorship, albeit 
unofficially.49 Van Goens was able to show his quality as a military commander once more, 
fighting the French in the South Asian waters and in Coromandel.  
After another five years of assaults and guerrilla warfare by the Kandyans, as well as heavy 
military engagements in the Indonesian archipelago and a costly war in Europe, the Dutch 
officials in patria and in Batavia reconsidered the policy towards Sri Lanka. The Council in 
Batavia was now even more convinced that their reluctance to commit to the conquest of Sri 
Lanka had been justified. In the United Provinces, there had been a large political shift as a 
result of the events of 1672. Many of Van Goens’ patrons among the Directors of the VOC 
were no longer in that position, being replaced by men less sympathetic to his strategic views, 
such as the aforementioned Joannes Hudde and Pieter van Dam. This caused a shift in patria 
towards the mercantile end of the spectrum, which continued until after De Heere’s tenure.50 
This made it increasingly hard for Van Goens to circumvent Batavia where he and his views 
were unpopular. On the other hand, he had once again proven his merit and experience during 
the war. As such, he was promoted first to director-general in Batavia in 1676, followed by a 
promotion to Governor General in 1678. Van Goens Jr. became the new Governor of Ceylon 
in an official capacity after his father was sent to Batavia. This was an unprecedented succession 
of father by son, which irked other VOC officials in Asia even more.51  
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In general, Van Goens Sr. was unable to keep the Council of Batavia on his side. As such, 
they often voted for proposals he did not agree with. The Council members realized they had 
to return lands to Kandy if they were to return to peace and be able to cut down on expenditure. 
In 1675 they sent instructions amounting to the full return of territories gained since 1665 to 
Ceylon, under heavy opposition from Van Goens. Governor of Ceylon Van Goens Jr. sent an 
altered proposal to Rajasimha. This latter proposal excluded multiple regions which the Dutch 
had recently taken and was therefore ignored by the king of Kandy.52  
With Van Goens as Governor General and his son as Governor of Ceylon, it seemed 
impossible for a return to peace with Kandy. In 1679, however, Van Goens Jr. vacated his 
office, which was taken over by Laurens Pijl, initially as a provisional Officer administrating 
the Government, then as Governor in 1681. Pijl wished to solve the problems of the Dutch on 
Sri Lanka and to do so turned to a report written by Adriaan van Reede in 1677 by orders of 
Batavia.53  
Adriaan van Reede tot Drakensteyn is an interesting figure in the story of Van Goens 
and Ceylon. He had been under the patronage of Van Goens for many years, eventually 
becoming Governor of Malabar. At that time Van Goens refused to listen to the opinion of Van 
Reede and attempted to micromanage him, provoking his ire.54 In 1677 he was tasked with 
reviewing Van Goens’ policies on Ceylon and Malabar. In the report, Van Reede voiced many 
criticisms, on matters ranging from Van Goens’ projections for trade and profits to his 
fortification programmes. The bias present on the side of Van Reede becomes obvious when 
one looks at his calculations for the soldiers required to man these fortresses. Van Reede 
assumed the European standard of three men per Rhineland Rod (3.77 metres) to defend the 
walls properly. This brought him to a total of sixty thousand men, which he reduced to around 
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thirty thousand with some concessions. This is still a ludicrous number, however, as the VOC 
never had more than around ten thousand regulars active in Asia, according to Gaastra’s data 
in De geschiedenis van de VOC. During De Heere’s inspection tour, it was still clearly a priority 
to reduce the costs of the forts system. As Odegard points out in his doctoral thesis, this number 
is clearly a piece of rhetoric. To start, the total mileage of the walls of these forts was not a 
strong basis for the calculation, as the fortifications often made use of the geography to allow 
only one approach for enemy soldiers.55 In Galle, for example, this would significantly reduce 
the garrison required, as one can see on the map taken from De Heere’s journal below. 
Still, the report had its intended effect. Laurens Pijl came to the conclusion that “it was 
impossible for the Dutch to subsist on the island without peace with Rajasimha.”56 He reported 
as much to the Council on Java. Despite Van Goens’ position as Governor-General, he could 
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Figure 1 Galle, taken from H47. The fortress can only be approached overland from the east, 
allowing for a much smaller garrison than if the (longer) other walls would also have to be 
protected. 
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not prevent the growth of a majority in the council opposed to him by 1681. In October and 
November, the Council formulated new policies based on an extensive review of previous Sri 
Lanka policy, and Van Goens retired from office in November.57  
The conclusions of the High Council were similar to those of Governor Pijl: it was not 
possible to defeat Kandy, and Rajasimha could significantly disrupt cinnamon production with 
relative ease. The fundamental question they asked themselves was why the Dutch were on Sri 
Lanka, and the answer was cinnamon. “Territorial commitment on the island and attendant 
expenditure was justified only so far as it was necessary for the maintenance of the cinnamon 
monopoly.”58 As such, policy became very different to that of Van Goens; the goal became to 
focus on the cinnamon monopoly, with expenditure as low as possible. These two points, the 
increased focus on commerce and importance of reducing costs, continue to be important in De 
Heere’s time. 
To do this, they offered to return much of the conquered territory. The Dutch wanted to 
come to a peace with Kandy before the elderly king would die, as they were unsure of the 
attitude of his successor. In Ceylon, the officers pleaded not to give up territory right before a 
possible succession crisis. On the other side of the frontier, Rajasimha was initially unwilling 
to even negotiate before his territory was returned, but with failing health he seemingly wanted 
to ensure good relations between the Dutch and Kandy for the sake of his successor.59 This 
successor refused to negotiate until trade was reopened for the Kandyans. The Dutch acquiesced 
in 1696 or 1697 and opened trade in goods other than cinnamon to private merchants.60 By 
1703, they closed the ports again because the Kandyans had tried to circumvent the Dutch 
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completely in trading. The Kandyan hostile response was shortlived and feeble. By 1707 the 
Dutch were no longer as worried about Kandyan hostilities, though they were still acutely aware 
that they could not take the island by force – certainly not in a profitable manner.61 
The story of Van Goens and the policy shift after his retirement is indicative of the position 
of Ceylon within the VOC. After Van Goens’ tenure it was possible for the Governor of Ceylon 
to communicate directly with the Directors, especially in the case of the strong personality and 
reputation of Van Goens. This dynamic, where Ceylon was technically subordinate to Batavia 
but could ignore their instructions or heavily disagree with the policy set forth by the Council 
there had a large influence on how the office operated. The story of Van Goens also shows the 
shifting attitude of the VOC officials in this period from accepting Van Goens’ state-like 
ambitions on Sri Lanka to the more mercantile end of the spectrum. Instead of warring with 
Kandy and focusing on territorial ambitions, commerce and therefore peace became a priority. 
While defensive measures were not abandoned, efforts were made to reduce the costs of 
fortifications on the island.  
The VOC in the Late Seventeenth Century 
The second half of the seventeenth century was one of both expansion and contraction for the 
VOC. Their operation in Asia expanded – and with them their expenses – but profits contracted. 
Though I will not go into much detail here, the reasons must be discussed in general terms to 
provide context for the subject of this thesis. 
In The First Modern Economy by Jan de Vries and Ad van de Woude, they call the “volatile 
years” of the 1670s the close of an “era” and the beginning of a new one. This new era, from 
1680 to 1730, was marked by steps taken by the Directors to “increase the volume and adjust 
the commodity composition of the Company’s trade.” 62 The two primary causes they identified 
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were the structural change in European tastes for Asiatic products and an “abundant supply of 
capital at low interest rates.”63 They also increased the labour force and both the amount and 
tonnage of return ships sent to Asia. Total revenue did not increase at the same rate, but this 
was what the VOC directors expected. Diversification in trade was meant to augment the spice 
trade. Generally, the VOC leadership did not reasonably expect to return to the remarkable 
profits of decades past but aimed to solidify the revenue of the company.64 
To secure the spice trade and expand in this way, the VOC proved more than willing to use 
political and military force. They fought Europeans and interfered in the affairs of local rulers. 
One other source of increased pressure in Asia was the interference of Europeans. The British 
East India Company attempted to fight over the control of trade, but a more telling example is 
the interference of the French.  
In the war of 1672-1674, the French attempted to take control of Trincomalee. Their fleet 
arrived in Surat in September 1671, then sailed to the bay of the former to attempt to build a 
fort with permission from King Rajasimha. The VOC had, as mentioned above, appointed Van 
Goens as supreme commander once more, who blockaded the bay of Trincomalee. The French 
were hoping for aid from king Rajasimha when Van Goens trapped them in the inner bay, but 
this help did not come. In July 1672 they escaped to Coromandel, where they captured 
Meliapore. This move angered the Qutb Shahi of Golconda, who joined Van Goens in an 
intermittent siege of the French forces, sometimes by forces of Golconda on land and sometimes 
by Dutch forces from the sea, eventually defeating them.65 
In 1674, the French established a trading post in Pondichéry. During the Nine Years’ War 
(1688-1697), the VOC headquarters on the Coromandel coast was moved south to put more 
pressure on the French position there. This shift south, so that the Dutch could rely on 
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reinforcements from Sri Lanka, is indicative of the efforts by the VOC as a whole to attempt to 
neutralize European competition and consolidate their hold on the Asian trade.66  
The role of Ceylon as a place to get reinforcements from is evidenced in the journal. The 
news of the Treaty of Rijswijk (1697) arrived in Sri Lanka on the 25th of May, 1698.67 On the 
12th of July of the same year, a letter from the Council and Commander of Nagapatnam arrived 
in the commandment of Jaffnapatnam, where De Heere was at that point. This letter spoke of 
the “torments”68 that the “unreasonable servants of the Great Mogol”69 exacted upon the Dutch 
at Pondichéry.70 Apparently, the Dutch had yet to vacate Pondichéry, despite it being part of 
the peace terms at Rijswijk. In fact, De Heere sent an order to Colombo to have a fluyt sail to 
Point Pedro to pick up one hundred soldiers to be sent to Coromandel.71 On the 17th of July, he 
sent another letter to Colombo with the instruction to ship sixty men to Jaffna to strengthen the 
garrison, from which 52 men had been drawn to be moved to Coromandel.72 
It is clear, then, that the VOC had a few main policy goals in Asia overall: diversify trade, 
protect the spice trade as the main core of the Company’s revenue, and increase the total volume 
of goods shipped.73  
Policy on Sri Lanka 
These goals were reflected in the new policies on Sri Lanka as instructed by the Directors and 
Batavia and executed by the Ceylon office. Where Van Goens wanted the VOC to act as a state 
and conquer the entirety of the island, his successors focused more on the mercantile aspects. 
The main goal of the Dutch presence on Sri Lanka was the cinnamon trade, which required 
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stable relations with Kandy. As such, the policy of the Ceylon office became to be outwardly 
submissive towards the king and to keep the peace. This changed when the Company had 
become much more confident in their ability to fight Kandy and they asserted themselves more 
forcefully, but this only becomes the case in the 1710s and 1720s, showing a return to a more 
state-like VOC. In the late seventeenth century, the VOC attempted to maintain cordial 
relations, though they still maintained fortresses on the island to protect their interests.  
Policy on Sri Lanka reflects certain themes of general VOC policy in Asia. The most 
important reason for the VOC’s existence was commerce, and while protecting this commerce 
through military means was certainly acceptable, it had to remain profitable. The period after 
1672 is marked by expansion of operations but attempts to reduce expenses, reflecting the shift 
on the spectrum.74 The High Council in Batavia reconsidered what was important in Sri Lanka 
in the 1680s. The fundamental question was why the Dutch had to wield power on the island. 
The answer was that “cinnamon was [the] chief motivating factor. All other considerations were 
subordinate and should not be allowed to get in the way of the cinnamon monopoly. Territorial 
commitment on the island and attendant expenditure was justified only so far as it was necessary 
for the maintenance of the cinnamon monopoly.”75 
As mentioned above, this resulted in diplomatic channels being reopened with the king of 
Kandy in the 1680s to discuss the territories the Dutch would be willing to return. Rajasimha 
initially showed no intentions of negotiating from a position of weakness in which the Dutch 
held his territory and were the ones who could dictate what would be given back. Eventually, 
the roles reversed. The Dutch had lost their enthusiasm for negotiation and were willing to stay 
in a stalemate for the same reason Rajasimha now tried to normalize relations: he was getting 
old. The king wanted to secure good relations for his heir; the Dutch feared a civil war breaking 
out in Kandy because they were not sure there was a Kandyan heir. For the VOC to give up 
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fortresses then, in the 1680s and 1690s, would be “to invite trouble.”76 Kandy continued to 
make overtures, with high ranking ambassadors and even the unilateral release of many Dutch 
prisoners. When Rajasimha died in 1687 and his son took the throne, the Dutch recognized him 
as king, expressed their condolences for the former’s death, and sent a company of Dutch troops 
and Sinhalese soldiers, called lascarins, to congratulate the new king.77  
Moving forward, then, there are a few policy goals to keep in mind when reading the journal 
of De Heere. These are reflections of the Dutch policy specific to Sri Lanka, as well as the 
overall goals of the VOC. The points presented below are the expectations I would have for 
policy pursued by the Dutch in Sri Lanka; in the following chapters I will show these are 
reflected in De Heere’s journal. As they are interrelated and have some overlap, there is no 
specific hierarchy present here. Firstly, the VOC would endeavour to protect the commercial 
interests in Sri Lanka. Primarily this concerned cinnamon, but elephants and other goods were 
also of importance. Besides protecting the cinnamon peelers, there was also the second policy 
point: maintaining peace with Kandy through diplomacy and deterrence. This means that the 
fortresses on the island must be maintained and should provide defence against any incursions 
from the highlands, but not be so deep inland as to aggravate the king.  
These forts would also serve to protect the Dutch interests in Ceylon against European 
threats, the third policy point I will look for. Much like the rest of the VOC’s possessions in 
Asia, Ceylon was under threat from the English, French, Portuguese and Danes. The fortresses 
on the coast had to protect against threats from the sea. However, this had to stay affordable. 
This fourth policy point, to reduce expenses where possible, was one of the main points for 
those who favoured the mercantile end of the spectrum. The profit margins of the VOC were 
shrinking and prices were unlikely to increase much. Without the ability to increase revenue in 
substantial enough amounts, expenses had to go down.   
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Chapter 2 – The Journal 
The journal of De Heere requires some specific context to be properly understood. This context 
exists on two levels. First, I will examine the physical aspects of the journal, with the objective 
of contextualizing the contents of the journal. This is particularly relevant for the maps it 
contains. The second part of this chapter will focus on the contents of the journal besides the 
maps and the text relating to them, as those sections will be examined further the next two 
chapters.  
Physical Context 
Initially, I started work on this thesis after I found the copy in the National Archives of the 
Netherlands in The Hague during my internship there. It appears that this copy is relatively 
unknown. I have not found any citation of it and was told in personal conversation by Gijs 
Boink, one of the collection specialists and authors of the Grote Atlas van de VOC series, that 
the authors of Volume IV: Ceylon (GAVOC IV) were fully unaware that this copy exists.78  
During my research, however, I found out that there is another copy of the manuscript in 
the collection of the University Library Leiden.79 This copy is titled Dagelijxe Aentekeningen 
gedaen en gehouden... in their catalogue but is also referred to as De Heere’s Diary by R. K. 
de Silva and K. D. Paranavitana, two authors who wrote on Ceylon.80 It appears this copy is 
much more well-known; the maps of this copy were also used for the GAVOC IV.81 The reason 
for the Leiden copy being more well-known can only be speculated upon; perhaps it is simply 
because it has a title instead of a number in a rather large archive.  
This copy is currently in the possession of the University Library Leiden, but it passed into 
its possession through the collection of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en 
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Volkenkunde (KITLV). Within this collection, it is part of the collection Johannes Hageman 
Jcz., a Dutch amateur historian based in Indonesia in the nineteenth century.82 He wrote on 
many aspects of Javanese history, as well as providing inventories of antiquities.83 It has proved 
difficult to find out how it came into the possession of the latter.  
The version in the National Archives is from the VOC archives, specifically the section 
Heren Zeventien en kamer Amsterdam, Overgekomen brieven en papieren uit Indië.84 In my 
experience working with these “Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren” or OBPs, it is not 
uncommon for copies to have been sent to the two largest chambers of the VOC in patria: 
Amsterdam and Zeeland. It would not surprise me, as such, that the copy in Leiden was 
originally sent to the chamber Zeeland. The archive of this chamber is rather incomplete and I 
have been able to find an entry for this journal. However, if this is the case, it is a mystery how 
the Indonesia-based Hageman came into possession of a Zeeland chamber manuscript. One 
could speculate that Hageman got his copy from the archives in Batavia, as it is not 
unreasonable to expect a copy to have been sent there in the seventeenth century. However, the 
Leiden copy is in a very good condition, which is unusual for archival material from this time 
that was stored in tropical conditions for multiple centuries. 
The differences between the two copies are very minor. Based on extensive random spot 
checks, the texts do not differ in content. The clerks who wrote the text were different however, 
which means there is not a 1:1 concordance between page numbers in the Leiden copy and folio 
numbers in the National Archives copy. Interestingly, the National Archives version has 
contemporary folio numbers in ink, whereas the Leiden copy has page numbers in pencil, which 
                                                 
82 All biographical details are from the only source I can find that writes about Hageman: T. C. L. Wijnmalen, 
‘Johannes Hageman J.C.z.: nekrologie’, De Nederlandsche Spectater (1872). The version I have consulted was 
reprinted from De Nederlandsche Spectater and can be found in Google Books here: 
<https://books.google.nl/books?vid=KBNL:UBL000034721&redir_esc=y> [Accessed 01/07/2018]. 
83 For example: Johannes Hageman (Jcz), Handleiding tot de kennis der geschiedenis, aardrijkskunde, fabelleer 
en tijdrekenkunde van Java: Kort begrip der algemeene geschiedenis van Java Deel I (Batavia 1852). 
84 I have simplified the archival structure to conserve space and readability. 
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appear to me to be of later date based on the style of the numbers. It is also worth noting that a 
mistake was made in the numbering in the National Archive version: the numbering jumps from 
249 to 451. After folio 249 follows Map 5, numbered 450 with pencil – most likely added at a 
later date – after which Map 6 and 7 appear, numbered 451 and 452 respectively.85 The text 
continues from 249v to 453r, so there are no pages missing; it appears to be a mere clerical 
error. The 23 maps in the journal, based on a full inspection, do not differ in content, only in 
minor stylistic components. This thesis will be based primarily on the text as it is written in the 
National Archives copy. This choice is based on the practical reason that this copy has been 
(mostly) digitized. Because of how minor the differences are there should not be any qualitative 
difference as a result of this choice.   
As mentioned above, the copy in the National Archives is part of the VOC archive, 
specifically within the Directors and Chamber of Amsterdam. In this section, the category the 
journal belongs to is the OBPs, the received letters and papers from the Indies. Generally 
speaking, these are bundles of such letters and papers, sometimes with maps included.86  
Materially, the journal fits in well with the other documents in this category. It uses the 
same kind of paper, ink and binding. The contents are very different however. Most of the OBPs 
are simply an incoherent collection of papers and letters, usually from the same office but 
without an internal cohesion like the journal has. There are a few other journals like this one, 
specifically from Ceylon, of which the most famous example is Isaac Rumpf’s travel diary, 
which has recently been translated into English by K. D. Paranavitana.87 These journals are the 
exceptions, however. 
                                                 
85 See the Appendix – Cartographic Material in De Heere’s Journal for the maps, numbered in the order in which 
they appear in the journal.  
86 Unfortunately, many of these maps were separated from this context. Some of these connections have been 
restored. For further details see Clemens Deimann, ‘Herkomstonderzoek naar uit hun context geraakte kaarten in 
de collectie van het Nationaal Archief’, Caert-Thresoor 37 1 (2018) 24-33. 
87 I. A. Rumpf, Travel Diary of Isaac Augustin Rumpf: The Dutch Governor of Ceylon (1716-1723) (Translated 
by K.D. Paranavitana, 2015). 
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Many of the OBPs have some degree of water damage, probably incurred on the voyage 
from Asia to the Netherlands. The journal has been spared this, mostly, and only has some 
discolouration from age. The copy in Leiden has fared better in that regard.  
Both copies have tears in the maps. These tears exist because of the way the maps are 
stored: folded into the books and upright. It seems unlikely to me that the tears were created by 
extensive usage; the spines of the books are not particularly damaged and it seems likely that 
extensively used maps would have been removed from the books, as has been done with other 
OBPs.  
The journal is fully in manuscript, as are the maps. We can infer from the content of the 
text and the context of the archive that this journal was not meant for wide consumption, but 
the fact the maps are in manuscript shows this as well: if they were meant for mass consumption 
they would usually be in print. Another reason the manuscript nature of the maps is interesting, 
though, is that there are at least two copies of each map, one for each journal in the Netherlands. 
Presumably, there was also at least one copy of each map in Sri Lanka for utilisation there. This 
means that the contents of the maps were deemed important enough to create multiple 
manuscript copies, which can be relevant for the interpretation of the purpose of these maps.  
Contents 
In the text, the journey is described as a “reijse en visite des eylands Ceijlon”.88 As such, the 
contents of the journal fall into roughly two categories: daily activities of the governor and 
inspections. Under daily activities I count those things which the governor of Ceylon is 
expected to do regardless of whether he is on an inspection trip or not. This includes 
correspondence with the Political Council at Colombo, the Council at Batavia, governors of the 
Indian offices, the king of Kandy et cetera. It also includes decisions about trade, solving 
                                                 
88 Literally “journey and visitation of the island of Ceylon”. VOC 1604B front matter. 
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disputes and other matters. Inspection includes the many inventories of personnel and the 
inspections of fortifications at the places visited.  
 Both of these broad categories will form a section below. First, however, I will identify 
the two most important participants of the journey for the present thesis: Governor Gerrit de 
Heere and military engineer and surveyor Johan Christiaanz. Toorzee. Within that first section 
I will also describe the route taken and the duration spent in each of the destinations. 
De Heere, Toorzee, and the Itinerary 
Gerrit de Heere took up the position of Governor of Ceylon in February 1697. Little has been 
written on him; as mentioned in the introduction, historians of Sri Lanka often skip over this 
period, and therefore also over Governor De Heere. When he is mentioned, it is mostly as a 
quick namedrop without further information. Lodewijk Wagenaar mentions that De Heere 
organized the return journey of Arakan monks from Sri Lanka but makes no further mention of 
him.89 In the History of Sri Lanka De Heere is mentioned once, by D. A. Kotelawele. The 
context of this mention, however, is that the Kandyans wanted to have a mission to Siam and 
“reminded the Dutch that in the time of Governor de [sic] Heere (1647-1703) the Dutch were 
of great assistance to the court in a similar matter.”90 This likely refers to the mission mentioned 
by Wagenaar.  
It is in histories of the VOC’s mapping activities that I found two other mentions of De 
Heere. In Kees Zandvliet’s seminal work Mapping for Money he mentions De Heere in relation 
to the tombo administration.91 He is referring to the inspection of the tombo administration of 
Jaffna during the journey discussed here. K. D. Paranavitana and R. K. de Silva mention him a 
few times in their book Maps and Plans of Dutch Ceylon, though they elucidate very little. 
They made heavy use of the maps in the Leiden copy of the journal, so De Heere is mostly 
                                                 
89 Lodewijk Wagenaar, Kaneel & OlifantenL Sri Lanka en Nederland sinds 1600 (Nijmegen 2016) 106. 
90 Kotelawele, ‘The VOC in Sri Lanka’ 243. 
91 Zandvliet, Mapping for Money 153. The tombo was essentially a land registry and will be discussed 
extensively in Chapter 3.  
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mentioned but not described. They do quote the paragraph of Zandvliet mentioned above and 
have an interesting take on De Heere’s relation to the tombo administration: “Governor Gerrit 
de Heere who took office in 1697 determined to push forward the tombo registration on 
scientific lines and appointed a committee the following year (composed of Gunnery Major and 
Engineer J C Toorzee, Claas Isaaqz […]) to suggest measures of improvement.”92 As will be 
further explained in Chapter 3, this might be giving De Heere too much credit; I have found 
little evidence of further pushes like this during his tenure.  
De Heere, then, appears to have left little which speaks to the imagination of historians. 
Whereas it is common for women in history to be known mostly for who they marry, De Heere’s 
only other claim to historic attention seems to have been his marriage to Johanna Maria van 
Riebeeck, who married the more well-known Governor General Joan van Hoorn after De 
Heere’s death in 1702 and left many letters written on the journey home to the Netherlands.93 
The other important figure for this 
thesis is Johan Christiaanz. Toorzee, a 
military engineer and surveyor. He signed 
all the maps in the journal and is one of 
the most prolific mapmakers of Sri Lanka. 
Hailing from Jutland, Denmark, he 
arrived in Asia on the Velzen for the 
Amsterdam Chamber. He was promoted 
to the rank of captain in 1699, after the 
inspection journey discussed here, and 
                                                 
92 Paranavitana and de Silva, Maps and Plans of Dutch Ceylon 21.  
93 Marion Peters, Riebeeck, Johanna Maria van, in: Digitaal Vrouwenlexicon van 
Nederland. <http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/vrouwenlexicon/lemmata/data/Riebeeck> [13-01-2014, consulted 
20-04-2018]. 
Figure 2 Kaarte van 't eijland Ceylon , Toorzee, 
National Archives VEL 923 
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became dessave of Colombo in July 1707. He died in 1709 in Batavia.94 Toorzee made many 
maps, including multiple versions of fortification maps of Colombo and other forts on Ceylon.95 
The most well-known map he made was the first “filled in” map of Ceylon, seen in Figure 2. 
As is usual for mapmakers very little else has been written about the man. He was an engineer 
and land surveyor, which explains the care with which he  
drew the manuscript maps presented in the journal.  
 The itinerary of the journey is 
displayed in the form of Table 1, as 
well as in the shape of a map in 
below. The table mentions the 
places at which the travellers 
stayed for at least a day. With the 
exception of Negombo near the 
end of the trip, they mostly did not 
stay in a place merely to rest for 
longer than a night or a few hours 
during the day. It is unclear from 
the text when they left Hanwella to 
return to Colombo near the 
beginning of the trip, and it is also 
unclear when Governor De Heere 
moved from Point Pedro to the 
Company garden at Nallur.  
                                                 
94 Zandvliet, Mapping for Money 274, in endnote 33 found on page 301.  
95 Most of these maps can be found in the National Archives, in the Collection Leupe (VEL). Most of these were 
clearly part of the aforementioned OBPs and some of these connections were restored, but this information is not 
presently available in the NA database.  
Location From Until 
Colombo Starting Location 31 March 
Negombo 31 March 3 April 
Malwana 4 April 5 April 
Hanwella 5 April ? 
Colombo ? 10 May 
Kalatura 10 May 12 May 
Galle 15 May 6 June 
Matara 6 June 1 July 
Batticaloa 3 July 5 July 
Trincomalee 6 July 11 July 
Point Pedro 13 July ? 
Nallur (Jaffna) ? At least 21 July 16 September 
Mannar 18 September 20 September 
Negombo 27 September 29 September 
Colombo 29 September Ending Location 
Table 1 Itinerary of De Heere's Party 
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  Figure 3 Map of Sri Lanka showing De Heere's route.  
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Also left out are the times when De Heere or Toorzee would leave the location they were staying 
at for one or more days to inspect another location nearby. For example, the table does not show 
Toorzee’s absence from Nallur during the inspection of the Jaffna tombo administration. The 
locations listed should be seen as a sort of ‘base of operations’ during the period attached to it.  
What stands out is that the Governor and his entourage stayed for slightly less than a month 
in both Galle and Matara, and about two months in Point Pedro and Jaffna put together. Seeing 
as Galle and Matara are, like Point Pedro and Jaffna, within a day’s travel of each other, one 
might group those two as well. As such, it is fair to say that the majority of the journey was 
spent in the main Dutch ports on the south coast and on the north coast of Sri Lanka. Much of 
the rest of the trip was spent going to forts for a few days and then moving on.  
Daily Activities 
One of the key components of ruling is communication. It is unsurprising, then, that much of 
the daily activities category consists of correspondence between Governor De Heere and other 
entities. In Chapter 1 I discussed the exchange of letters concerning a troop movement from Sri 
Lanka to Coromandel, but many other letters were sent and received.   
Interestingly, some letters are copied into the text while others are not. A letter from a local 
ruler on the Madurai coast concerning possible breaches of contract between him and the 
Company was copied fully, but on the last page of this copy the diary then continues with 
“Received a missive from merchant and chief Krijn Caperman, from the council of Tutucorijn 
dated the 23rd of the past month August being of such content, as will be found in the book of 
received letters in Colombo.”96 The italicised part states that the content of the received letter 
can be found in the “received letter-book” of Colombo’s secretariat. The only note for the next 
day of the journal is that a letter was received from the Political Council of Colombo, the 
                                                 
96 Italicisation mine. VOC 1604B 582r. “Ontfangen een missive vanden coopman en opperhooft Krijn 
Caperman, nevens den raad tot Tutucorijn gedateert 23e den gepasseerde maand aug:o zijnde van zodanigen 
inhout, als bij het aancomend briev-boek den Colombose secretijstaat gevonden tewerden.” 
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contents of which can be read in the “afgaande briev-book”, or “sent letter-book”.97 It appears 
that letters to and from other political entities were copied, as well as letters which were not 
sent to or received from Colombo. 
One letter in particular that is worth highlighting was sent to Kandy regarding the Treaty 
of Rijswijk. As mentioned in the previous chapter, news of the peace with the King of France 
had come on the 24th of May 1698, when De Heere and company were in the Commandment 
of Galle. On the 28th, De Heere sent a letter to the court of Kandy to inform the king of the 
peace with France. It is noteworthy that he refered to the Kandyan King as the “grootmagtigsten 
Monargh en onverwinnelijcken Keijsser” or “mighty Monarch and unconquerable Emperor” 
multiple times in the letter.98 The letter is also signed “His Mighty Monarch, and unconquerable 
Emperor’s loyal governor and obedient servant signed: Gerrit de Heere”.99 This is a clear 
indication of the VOC’s policy to be outwardly polite and subordinate to the Kandyan king, 
even if the Dutch were occupying the king’s land and therefore all but obedient.  
A regularly recurring subject is that of trade in elephants. The second most important trade 
good of Sri Lanka at the time brings with it many lists of elephants, inspections of stables and 
disputes over the animals. When visiting Matara in June, for example, the journal lists the 
seventy elephants stabled there. It includes their height and notes such as “short tail”, “small 
piece missing from the left ear”, and “is with young”.100 Similar lists appear in multiple places 
throughout the journal. While the elephant trade was not as important as the cinnamon trade, 
this still shows the priority given to trade, one of the four policy points the VOC focused on in 
this period.  
                                                 
97 Ibidem.  
98 VOC 1604B 473r-473v.  
99 VOC 1604B 473v. “Sijn Grootm: Monargh, en onverw: keijsers getrouwen gouverneur en gehoorsamen dienaar 
getekent: Gerrit de Heere”.  
100 VOC 1604B 500r.  
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Sometimes seemingly minor incidents relating to elephant trade are also mentioned: on the 
22nd of August, in Jaffna, a “Moorish merchant named Resolu Khan”101 arrived from 
Coromandel and requested to buy elephants. He had heard that the elephant trade had been 
completed for this year but asked if it was possible to sell his goods anyway. He was then very 
pleased to hear there were still some elephants left to be sold to him.102 
One interesting example of local affairs being taken up by Governor De Heere is one 
concerning “Moors”, that is, Muslims. This episode took place at Galle in May 1698. On folios 
464-466 it is mentioned that Governor Van Goens has attempted to repulse Moors and 
“Portuguese creaturen” by disallowing them to buy real estate. However, by offering loans to 
Dutch and Singhalese inhabitants of the city with the latter’s houses as collateral, they still 
managed to procure houses and land.103 Some deliberations were had, and a few days later a 
letter was received from the Political Council of Colombo concerning, among other matters, 
this Muslim property issue. It was decided to release a notice: Muslims would no longer be 
allowed to procure property in Galle.104 
Inspections 
Besides these kinds of rulings, there were the actual inspections, which happened not just in 
these major locations, but also in the places which were visited for only a few days. These fall 
into three main categories: land division, fortifications and personnel. The first two will be 
discussed in respectively Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, because they involve cartographic material 
I want to discuss in detail for the purposes of the thesis. The matters of personnel are dealt with 
in text only, which I will discuss here. 
In each of the places visited, a list was made of the personnel present there. Personnel was 
divided into ranks and ethnicity; distinguishing between “Europeanen”, “mestiesen” and 
                                                 
101 VOC 1604B 573r. “moors-coopman genaamt Resolukhan” 
102 VOC 1604B 573r-573v. 
103 VOC 1604B 464-466. 
104 The letter from Colombo: VOC 1604B 474-482, “Placcaat”: 482v. 
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“toepassen”. The latter two categories are somewhat difficult to separate but based on the VOC-
glossary by M. Kooijmans and J.E. Oosterling, the mesties is a person of mixed European and 
Asian heritage, and a toepas is a Christian native, though they might also have Portuguese 
ancestry.105  
In the majority of the lists, it also mentions how much the employees were paid, sometimes 
in rice, sometimes in cash, sometimes both. It also happened that soldiers were given a parcel 
of land to feed themselves and their families with. These inventories of personnel were made 
primarily to lower the salaries where possible, though. 
The very first inspection exemplifies this. It is explained that the fort is mostly useful to 
protect the cinnamon warehouses from water. It is unnecessary to “keep the large number of 
troops other than a good guard to show the Company’s possession: which men thought would 
suffice at 57 heads”.106 Then, an inventory is made of the personnel currently present in the fort, 
a total of 139 people.  
Twenty toepassen were removed from their duties, as they could be done without, ten 
mestiesen were discharged because they were “incompetent and unworthy”107 to work for the 
Company because of their “debauchery and vexatious lives”.108 Fifty-two other employees 
would be divided between other places to replace those toepassen who were still to be 
discharged. These toepassen were easy to discharge because they “can always be assembled 
again, if need be”.109 
It is then decided that the native employees are being paid too much, especially those who 
are already receiving rice besides their cash payments. As such, their salaries are lowered, 
                                                 
105 M. Kooijmans and J.E. Oosterling, VOC-Glossarium: verklaringen van termen, verzameld uit de Rijks 
Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, die betrekking hebben op de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (The Hague 
2000). Viewed online at <http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/pdf/vocglossarium/VOCGlossarium.pdf> [06-04-
2018]. 
106 VOC 1604B 226v, list on 226v-227r.  
107 VOC 1604B 227v. “onbequaam en onwaardigh” 
108 Ibidem. “debouchie en ergerlijck leven” 
109 VOC 1604B 230r.  
37 
 
meticulously tracked in another table listing the names of those who are paid 1 or more 
rijksdaalders per month, while those who are paid one third rijksdaalders per month are listed 
by role and ethnicity.110   
In Matara, too, an inventory of personnel was made. This list is so long it covers four pages, 
including native, European, toepas and mesties personnel and the rice and rijksdaalders paid to 
them. The next entry after the list is that of the 8th of June, in which there’s only mention of the 
fact the whole day was spent deliberating over how to best reduce the costs of Matara, which 
in the end would be mostly done by reducing the salaries, both in cash and kind, given to the 
European and native personnel.  
Not every entry about personnel is fully based on reducing the salaries of employees or 
discharging them. While it is mentioned multiple times that especially mestiesen and toepassen 
were discharged for bad behaviour, there are also some occurrences of pensions being given to 
those who served long and faithfully. To stay in Matara, five men who had served the company 
for thirty, forty, or even fifty years were given a continued salary of a few rijksdaalders a month, 
despite being too old now to work.111  
In Hanwella, one toepas captain was considered redundant, but was still kept on because 
of his competence. Instead of staying here, where he would be in command of European troops 
and would not have much authority over them, he was sent to Colombo, where his experience 
with “land affairs”112 would be useful. Besides this, it was generally useful to keep men like 
him on, “so that we would not be lacking an officer of such competence, if it would become 
necessary to enlist toepassen for some time: because that folk are used to his command, and he 
knows especially well how to rule them.”113 
                                                 
110 VOC 1604B 231r-232r. 
111 VOC 1604B 500v-501r. 
112 VOC 1604B 237r. “landzaken” 
113 Ibidem.  
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These are exceptions to the rule, however. For the most part, when De Heere arrived in one 
of the Dutch establishments on Sri Lanka, an inventory of personnel was made and followed 
by either an explication of those who were discharged or a list of those who were kept on.  
It is clear, then, that one of the primary purposes of this journey was to reduce costs, as was 
predicted in chapter 1. In this sense, the personnel aspect of the inspections is very much a 
reflection of the overall goals of the VOC in this period: continue or even expand commerce 
but reduce costs where possible.   
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Chapter 3 – Overview Maps and Land Survey Maps 
As discussed in the introduction, the fourteen fortification maps comprise the majority of 
cartographic material and are thus in need of a specific chapter. The maps and drawings 
discussed in this chapter, then, are the other types. They can be divided into two categories: 
Overview maps and land survey maps. To start with, I will discuss the six overview maps in 
the journal. These are maps of parts of Sri Lanka, showing the important rivers, cities, ports and 
the coastlines to a few kilometres inland in three of them, while two others show the bays of 
Trincomalee and the final one shows a stretch of coastline. Second, I will discuss the 
aforementioned report on land surveys by Toorzee, including a discussion of the attached maps.  
Overview Maps 
In both the Leiden University Library and the National Archives copy, one of the first pages of 
the manuscript is the map shown in Figure 5 and Figure 4, respectively. There are small 
differences, but they are in essence the same map of the lands surrounding Colombo. I will 
discuss the overview maps in the journal in the order they appear. This means that the purpose 
of the map of Colombo’s surroundings and the similar one of Galle will be discussed first. 
Afterwards, I will briefly examine the other overview maps that appear and reflect on the 
purposes of these maps.  
 
 Figure 5 Map of Colombian Lands, VOC 1604B  Figure 4 Map of Colombian Lands, 
H47 
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There is another map, again in two copies in the two different versions of the manuscript, 
which looks fairly similar to the one pictured above. This second map can be found in the 
appendix of this thesis and shows the lands surrounding Galle. It, too, is oriented in such a way 
that the sea is at the bottom of the map and it, too, uses colours to distinguish between the 
different corles, or districts. These two maps, of the lands surrounding Colombo and Galle, are 
clearly within the same category. As such, I will focus on the map of the lands surrounding 
Colombo and the reader may assume the comments on purpose carry over to the map of Galle 
as well. The map of “Colombese landen”, or “Colombian lands”, is a manuscript, coloured map. 
The text on it reads as follows in translation, with the names in the original spelling: 
map of Colombian Lands 
 Presently belonging to the district or dessave; to the north determined by the river of 
Caymello, and to the south by that of Bentotte; consisting of the following Corles, 
namely; Alutcour, Hapittijgam, Hina, Hevegam, Halpittij, Reijgam, Passedum, and a 
part of the Wallalawittij Corle. Wherein lies the fortresses Colombo, Nigombo, 
Hangwelle and Kaliture. 
Colombo the 16th November Anno 1698 
[signed J.C. Toorzee, Engineer]114 
 
The map is primarily meant to illustrate the territory belonging to the dessave, or district, 
of Colombo. The colours on the map represent the different corles, smaller districts sub-
ordinate to the dessave. It appears very unlikely that these maps were coloured after the maps 
arrived in the Netherlands, for practical reasons. Also, the colours and ink interact on the page 
in a way they wouldn’t if the colouring was of later date. Other than the extent of the corles 
within the dessave, the map shows important rivers in dark blue and the important roads in 
yellow with black dots. Many of the towns are also shown with small circles, as well as the 
fortresses owned by the Dutch in small representations of the layout as can be seen in Figure 6.  
                                                 
114 VOC 1604B 228. 
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 Gourbevile, a small fort built 
near Hangwelle, is also marked. 
Similarly, other small forts appear on the 
map, but none of them are mentioned in 
the description. This points in the same 
direction for the purpose of this map as 
the other details mentioned: it is meant 
to be an accompaniment to the travel 
journal to give a sense of where the 
places mentioned in the text are. It is 
surprising in a way, then, that no route is 
visible on the map. One might expect 
that Toorzee would have marked the 
journey on this overview, but that is not 
the case. Neither of these two overview 
maps, of Colombo’s and Galle’s 
hinterlands, are mentioned at all in the 
text. This further supports the notion that they were added after the journey was completed as 
an overview of the places visited. The dates on the signature of Toorzee on the maps are in 
November, two months after the party returned to Colombo. Evidently, they were added later. 
A final reason to believe the purpose of these maps is to give an overview is that the map of 
Galle’s surroundings starts where the map of the Colombo district ends: the river Bentotte. This 
continuity implies that each overview map is meant to accompany the time spent in that district.  
The third overview map (Map 10) is different from these two. It is a map of the coastline 
between the fort of Batticaloa and that of Trincomalee, showing “how far apart the forts […] 
Figure 6 Fortresses on the Colombo Overview Map. 
The top section is in original orientation, Nigombo 
Colombo and Caliture are rotated 90 degrees 
counter-clockwise to maintain the resolution of the 
image presented here. 
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lie.”115 The description then specifically mentions that the map goes on north, past Trincomalee, 
until it reaches “the river Palvakeaar; from where the map of Wannij and Jaffanapatnam [sic] 
is continued.”116  
This map of Wanny and Jaffnapatnam (Map 15) is of a smaller scale than the other ones, 
showing much more territory. The description points out some important features of this map: 
the coloured four provinces of the Jaffna peninsula and the “inhabited islands”, the fortifications 
on the Jaffna peninsula marked with letters, and the “New Elephants-road” marked in red.117 
Much like those previously discussed, this map is meant to show the places the group has visited 
on this inspection journey, but without a marked route. The fortifications shown with letters on 
the map are all ones mapped by Toorzee. The elephant road is mentioned in one of the many 
pages of the manuscript devoted to the elephant trade. The final overview map shows the bay 
of Trincomalee (Map 14). This one is different from the others mostly in the sense that its focus 
is on the water near Trincomalee, instead of the land controlled by the Dutch. Otherwise, its 
role and purpose are much the same: it is an illustration of the areas visited by the party of De 
Heere.  
To summarize, these maps are all meant to frame the journey of De Heere and his company. 
They do not support a specific argument and are not directly involved in the text, but they are 
meant to provide the reader with some spatial context. They are, then, not purely decorative, 
but they are not meant to support an argument either.  
Land Survey Maps 
In a sense, the land survey maps are the opposites of these overviews. These are maps with the 
express purpose of being an accompaniment to a report written up by Toorzee and a few other 
                                                 
115 VOC 1604B 521. “kaarte waarinne vertoont wert, hoeverre de forten Batticaloa en Tricoenmale [sic] van 
malkander leggen”. 
116 VOC 1604B. “en verder noordwaarts tot aan de revier Palvakeaar; vanwaar de kaarte der Wannij en 
Jaffanapatnam werd vervolgt.” 
117 VOC 1604B 536. 
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employees of the VOC. In this section, I will first discuss what the tombo is, as well as some 
historiographical notes on this particular situation. Then I will examine the report, first focusing 
on the textual part, then on the maps, then on the “amplification” and the responses to all of it 
by Governor De Heere.  
The Tombo 
The tombo administration was initially introduced by the Portuguese. They were the first 
European power to hold significant lands in Sri Lanka and sought to properly record the land 
holdings of its inhabitants so they could be taxed.118 They started this process after integrating 
the conquered kingdom of Kotte, which held the western part of Sri Lanka. Kotte itself had a 
form of land administration called lekam miti, which the Portuguese based their administration 
on.119 When the Dutch conquered land from the Portuguese, they in turn took over the tombo 
from the Portuguese.  
Unlike the Portuguese, however, the Dutch saw the need to have maps accompanying the 
tombo. There were two parts of the tombo: the Head tombo and the Land tombo. The former 
was a registry of people living in the lands controlled by the Dutch, while the latter was a 
registration of their lands. The Land tombo records owner of the land, the names of the lands 
he owns, the trees planted there, and the revenues due from it.120 With the maps, however, one 
could also see the shape and the extent of these lands as well as their relative positioning. As 
written in the report of Toorzee’s group, it was difficult to make an accurate count of the various 
trees each tract of land without a proper map of the different tracts and their borders. This, in 
turn, would make it more likely that the resulting inaccuracy in the number of trees on a plot of 
land would incur a tax rate either too high or too low for the person in question.121 
                                                 
118 Paranavitana, Land for Money 1-2.  
119 Ibidem 4-5. 
120 Ibidem 86-87 has examples of entries in both the Head tombo and the Land tombo, translated into English.  
121 VOC 1604B 558r.  
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The initiative to map these lands started, according to Paranavitana, with the efforts of De 
Heere and Toorzee. I find this assertion strange, however, as this 1698 report refers multiple 
times to “the map” or “the maps” with which Toorzee’s measurements would be 
“confronted”.122 Evidently there had already been some efforts to make maps before Toorzee’s 
report. The point of their inspection, after all, was to see if the maps created in Jaffna were 
accurate enough after complaints from the inhabitants of this district. It is difficult to ascertain 
whether these fairly recent maps were the first of their kind, so perhaps Paranavitana was 
referring to the last decade of the 17th century as a period in which the first initiative for mapping 
was taken.  
The Report 
The inspection discussed here was undertaken by Constable Major Jan Christiaanz. Toorzee, 
Lieutenant Claas Isaackz., tombohouder or tombokeeper Pieter Bolscho, and wage bookkeeper 
Joannes Schouten. More information on these men is difficult to find. Why Toorzee and 
Bolscho were chosen is fairly obvious: Toorzee was a trained cartographer and Bolscho was 
the keeper of the tombo. Schouten might have been chosen because he was an accountant. 
Lieutenant Isaackz. can only be speculated upon. Perhaps his rank indicates that he, too, was 
an engineer, but this is not mentioned in the text. The inspection was initiated because there 
were many “complaints and rumours” about the recently created new tombo of Jaffna.123 Their 
objective was to provide a written report which would elucidate any defects of this new land 
register. The ordinance was written on Monday the 21st of July 1698.  
On the 9th of August, the report was delivered to Governor De Heere. It was found that 
there were many defects in the new tombo and the maps made by the surveyors. When Toorzee 
remeasured the lands near the village of Tetkukoernitje, he found that the recorded maps were 
                                                 
122 For example: VOC 1604B 558v. The Dutch term used are “de kaart” or “de kaarten” and “geconfronteerd” 
respectively.  
123 VOC 1604B 541r. 
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quite distorted. For example, one line of land division was too long to even fit on the map. This 
meant that either the measurement tools were incorrect, or the maths done to convert the 
measurements onto paper went wrong, or both.124  
As it turned out, the measurement tools were rather faulty. The local surveyors had been 
using measuring ropes, as opposed to chains. This caused issues because conditions caused by 
for example weather could make the ropes lengthen or shorten. When confronted with a proper 
measuring chain, the longest rope, that of Hendrik de Kroese, was 6 duim, or inches, too long 
on 6 Rijnlandse Roede.125 The shortest rope, belonging to Jeronimus Heelaart,126 was 5½ duim 
too short.127 The total difference between the longest and shortest measuring rope would then 
be 11½ duim, or 29.56 cm. This could cause a fairly significant distortion and both make the 
tax rates for various people higher or lower than they should be or make it impossible to make 
a proper inventory of the trees on a plot of land, as the map would be inaccurate. Furthermore, 
the compasses used were of bad quality: they had a deviation between them of up to 3 degrees.   
In the next village, more faults were found, with the native surveyors having bad equipment 
again. It was noted that the local 
inhabitants were not even able to 
show the boundaries of their own 
lands. The bottom right of the 
larger map shows this region, as 
isolated in Figure 7. The yellow 
part comprises lands which were 
accurately portrayed in the locally 
                                                 
124 VOC 1604B 558r.  
125 1 duim ≈ 2.57 cm, 1 Rijnl. R. ≈ 3.76 meters, so on a total of ± 22.56 m the rope was 15.42 cm too long. 
126 On the map by Toorzee his name is spelt “Jeronimus Hillaartsz.” 
127 ≈ 14.14 cm on 22.56 m. 
 Figure 7 Land survey map, bottom right only. VOC 
1604B 
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produced maps, whereas the green section had some deviation. For the pink part, the deviation 
could not be determined because of a map “defect”.128 
At the village of Altchewelij the four native 
surveyors were tasked with drawing six lots of 
land. These were then confronted with the map 
made by Toorzee, as can be seen on the land 
survey map. I have cut out each of the six maps 
and put them together in Figure 8. The top left 
image is the map drawn by Toorzee, the top 
right is by Jeronimus Hillaartsz. The two middle 
maps are both by Casper Tielensz., where the 
one on the left is the map which accompanied 
the tombo, and the right is the map made in this 
exercise. The map on the bottom left was drawn 
by Hendrik d’Kroese, while the bottom right 
map is by the hand of Andris Honter. Evidently, they all have different results. Some are 
distorted in shape to an unacceptable degree, especially that by Hillaartsz, but there are also 
large discrepancies in the area calculated by these surveyors. Whereas the actual area, as 
calculated by Toorzee, is 3066 square Rhoede, the surveyors come to different numbers. The 
highest number comes from d’Kroese, who claims the land has an area of 3361 square Rhoede, 
while the lowest number in the exercise comes from Honter, with 3110 square Rhoede. This 
comes to a total difference of 251 square Rhoede, or 3,562 square meters. This is more than 1⁄3 
of a hectare, or almost an acre, of difference.  
                                                 
128 “manquement” 
Figure 8 The six maps made to test the surveyors. 
VOC 1604B 
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Clearly, the surveyors were not very good at their job. Toorzee et al appear to have drawn 
the same conclusion. In fact, when discussing one particularly inaccurate map, they say it is 
such a “mess of lines and blotches, it seems like it was designed by a lunatic rather than a land 
surveyor.”129 When resorting to the new tombo, it turned out to not be much better. The 
conclusion of Toorzee et al was, then, that the register of lands was insufficient. The role of the 
maps accompanying this report is different from the overview maps in exactly that sense. They 
are an accompaniment to the text, illustrating what is reported and giving further information. 
The other small maps on the sheet are similar in purpose to the ones already highlighted.  
In response to the report, De Heere ordered Toorzee and his fellow commissioners to write 
an amplification for the report, as it was not clear enough on their conclusions and 
recommendations. A few days later, this addition came in. It takes a step back and summarizes 
the situation and the conclusions of Toorzee. In short, the conclusion was that the new land 
registry is wholly inadequate.  
They concluded that the new tombo was ordered for good reasons, which Toorzee listed in 
four points:130 (1) To find lands which were concealed before. (2) To relieve the tax pressure 
on the poor. (3) To increase yearly income. (4) To have pertinent maps of all the lands in the 
area. 
Unfortunately, this did not work out very well. The concealed areas were often still not 
accurately represented. The methods used were indeed meant to relieve the poor, but in the end 
the tax reductions mostly helped the rich circumvent taxation while the poor still had to pay. 
The income increases were fairly minimal and the maps were, as we saw above, inadequate. 
The idea was good, then, but the execution was lacking. The problems, as pointed out by 
Toorzee’s group, boiled down to four factors: (1) The surveyors were natives who lacked the 
                                                 
129 VOC 1604B 561v. “een menigte liniën en kladden, die meer door een kranksinnige als bij een Landmeter 
scheenen ontworpen.” 
130 VOC 1604B 570r. 
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knowledge and experience to map these areas properly. (2) The measuring ropes were faulty 
and the surveyors did not bother to use even wooden pegs to mark what they had already 
measured, deeming a groove in the ground to be sufficient. (3) The compasses were inadequate. 
(4) The drawing materials were also not up to standard. In conclusion, then, it was impossible 
for the surveyors to deliver on the maps which were intended to improve the land registry.   
De Heere’s response to this amplification, which was presumably sent on to Batavia, was 
agreement. His opinion on the matter was that while it would be very useful to have a new high-
quality tombo, accompanied by properly drawn maps, the VOC would need to employ 
European land surveyors to do this. In addition, they would require additional employees to 
supervise the process and eliminate possible corruption.131 The implication seems that this 
might not be worth the money.  
This is why the statement made by Paranavitana and his co-writer De Silva in Maps and 
Plans of Dutch Ceylon, where they assert that De Heere “determined to push” for a new 
registration based on scientific lines seems rather bold to me. From what I can tell, De Heere 
certainly appreciated the usefulness of such an endeavour, but it appears that it was not actually 
undertaken until the tenure of Governor Gustaaf Willem, Baron van Imhoff (1736-1640). De 
Heere clearly thought that the endeavour of mapping these areas and creating a new tombo was 
useful, but it does not appear he found it worthwhile. In this sense, he is clearly not on the state 
side of the merchant-state spectrum. Administrating land and extracting taxes from it is 
important to make territorial possessions worth keeping, but reducing costs took precedence for 
De Heere.   
 
  
                                                 
131 VOC 1604B 570v-571r.  
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Chapter 4 – Fortification Plans 
There are two reasons the fortification plans in De Heere’s journal are particularly interesting. 
As mentioned in the introduction, European fortifications in general, but in Asia in particular, 
are not well studied. There is a severe lack of specific literature on the subject. Therefore, there 
will be a section below to elucidate the nature of European forts, as well as a section on how 
they were different in Asia. 
 The other reason these maps are so interesting is that they provide very good examples 
of the policy points I expected to see after examining the context of the VOC and Sri Lanka in 
Chapter 1. The map of Nigombo and the deliberations that come with it in the text will show 
the primary concern of the VOC was to protect their commercial interests in Sri Lanka. After 
that, some smaller fortifications in the province of Jaffna will exemplify the policy of 
maintaining the peace with Kandy, as became the standard after the two Van Goenses left their 
respective offices. The remaining two policy points of reducing costs and protecting against 
European powers in Asia are more ubiquitous than the first two and will therefore be 
exemplified by a few cases in short, instead of one at length.  
European Fortifications: Developments and Innovations 
After the introduction of gunpowder, European siege warfare changed over time. Initially, guns 
were inaccurate, prone to failure and expensive, but as they became more numerous and 
available, medieval style castles with vertical stone walls became obsolete. The response was 
perhaps the most iconic part of the European style early modern fortress: the bastion. It is this 
structure which Parker saw as the innovation that started the military revolution. It is also a 
good starting point for explaining why European forts were made the way they were.  
Where medieval castles had vertical walls, early modern forts were built with thicker, 
sloping walls and broader parapets, to prevent breaches by cannon fire and protect against small 
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shot fired at defenders on the walls.132 They would usually be made by digging a moat around 
the fortress and using the displaced earth to make the basis of a wall, which was often covered 
by stone or preferably brick. This, however, removed the ability to use vertical fire to cover the 
walls, making flanking fire even more important. The most successful solution for this was the 
Italian bastion. The basic premise of the bastion’s effectiveness is that it provides flanking fire 
along the curtain wall and for the bastion on the opposite side of the wall. In this way, attackers 
would be in a crossfire of cannon and musket fire. At the same time, it functioned as a covered 
position and large platform for guns firing at enemy siege emplacements and breaching batteries 
in front of the wall they were attached to.  
On Figure 9 a representation is given of the fields of fire provided from three positions on 
the walls of Manaar. On the left (northern) side of the fort, the blue arrow pointing down from 
bastion b shows that fire could come from that position along the face of bastion c. If bastion c 
was a square tower, there would be an area of “dead ground” uncovered by fire, where enemy 
soldiers could find safety. The circle of dead ground near bastion b would be covered by fire 
from other positions.133 Crucially, it would not be 
covered if there could be no fire coming from the other 
bastion. On the right side, the two fictional positions 
are chosen to have lines of fire that go as closely along 
the face of the opposite bastion. This shows how much 
of the wall and bastion a could provide fire along the 
face of bastion b and vice versa. It also shows the 
crossfire created in front of the fortress.  
                                                 
132 Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams, Firearms and Fortification: Military Architecture and Siege Warfare in 
Sixteenth-century Siena (Chicago 1986) 8-17.  
133 The extent of dead ground is based on a firing angle of 60 degrees and the height of the walls being 26.5 feet 
as indicated on the map. The 60 degrees is somewhat guesswork, but sharper angles seem unlikely. The amount 
of dead ground from the wall turns out to be around 13.6 meters or 3.5 Rijnlandse Roeden.  
Figure 9 Fields of Fire. Edited detail 
of Map 22. 
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The bastion spread quickly, in large part thanks to the Habsburg empire, which included 
parts of Italy at the time. This allowed them to recruit engineers there and use them to build 
fortifications in Spain, the Netherlands, the Holy Roman Empire and the Americas.134  
Developments differed in various parts of Europe, which Odegard examines quite extensively. 
Here I will focus solely on the developments in the Low Countries, as it is most pertinent to the 
subject here. Around the turn of the seventeenth century, new innovations quickly became 
mandatory for a fort to be considered up to date. The most important of these was the covered 
way, which was a road leading around the moat of the fortress. Between the besiegers and the 
defenders on this road was a glacis, an artificial slope which would protect the defenders on the 
road and also provide cover for the fortress walls by making sure it could not be targeted from 
a close range without the shot bouncing off the glacis.135 Like the bastion before it, this 
innovation also increased the required garrison strength.  
Initially, besiegers would surround these forts by double walls, one facing the defenders 
and one facing a potential relief force. As the seventeenth century progressed, though, this tactic 
made way for a strategy developed by Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, artillery commander of 
Louis XIV’s armies. Instead of the double wall to defend against relieving armies, the besieging 
army was split into two. One part would besiege the city, with only one wall facing the 
defenders, while the other part of the army would watch for any relief forces approaching and 
intercept them. This saved a lot of time, as only one wall had to be built.  
This new tactic and others, combined with new armaments such as mortars, made it so that 
fortresses were guaranteed to fall sooner or later. In the war of 1672-1673, Vauban proved his 
methods were sound, taking many fortifications much faster than anticipated. The Dutch 
defence of Holland and Zeeland is a classic example of sound defensive warfare, however. The 
                                                 
134 Charles van den Heuvel, ‘Papiere Bolwercken’: de introductie van de Italiaanse stede- en vestingbouw in de 
Nederlanden (1540-1609) en het gebruik van tekeningen (Alphen aan den Rijn 1991) 23-48.  
135 Odegard, Unpublished Monograph Chapter 2.  
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strategy of inundating the low-lying polders of eastern Holland with fortifications at key points 
introduced a new idea in fortification: defence through a physical obstacle and a system of forts 
to prevent the movement of enemy armies. Systems of fortifications became the norm in the 
eighteenth century. Further changes in the physical shape of individual forts also occurred in 
this century but fall outside the scope of this research. This system of fortification is what 
typifies the attempts in Sri Lanka. 
Dutch Fortifications on Sri Lanka: Initial Purposes and Criticisms 
With the ability – and sometimes necessity – to wage war independently of the Dutch Republic, 
the VOC required more military strength than would be expected of a strictly mercantile 
company. As has been shown above, whether this was desirable was a debate which raged 
contemporarily, with the main proponent for the VOC as a territorial and military power in Asia 
in the seventeenth century being Rijckloff van Goens. It was Van Goens who initiated the 
construction of most of the fortifications on Ceylon.  
The fort system he created on Ceylon and nearby Malabar had, as Erik Odegard puts it, a 
dual purpose: to dominate the commercial traffic of Ceylon and the Malabar Coast, and to 
ensure the company’s control over these regions by providing obstacles to invading European 
forces or local states.136 Looking back to the policy points I listed at the end of Chapter 1, we 
see that protecting the commerce of Ceylon and protecting against European invasions was seen 
as an important purpose of the fortifications. The other two points, reducing costs and 
maintaining the peace with Kandy, came into being after Van Goens retired. As such, it is 
unsurprising that they were not considerations for Van Goens, who saw the costs as an 
investment to achieve remarkable profits later and wished to conquer Kandy. As will be shown 
                                                 
136 Odegard, Unpublished Mongraph Chapter 4. Odegard explicitly mentions that Van Goens insisted that the 
fortifications would be able to withstand a European siege but provides no specific reference to evidence thereof. 
However, based on the general disposition of Van Goens and his plans to make Ceylon the capital of the VOC in 
Asia, as well as the European style of the forts, this seems likely to be true.  
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below, by the time of De Heere’s inspection, these points were in fact an important 
consideration.  
How did Van Goens’ system of fortifications intend to protect the Company’s possessions 
on Sri Lanka against Europeans? There are two main factors to consider: 
the style of the individual fortifications and the system as a whole. Firstly, 
the individual forts were built in the European style, with bastions and 
sloped walls being nearly ubiquitous. In fact, one of the few forts visited 
by De Heere which lacks such a wall is Batticaloa (in use since 1638). 
On the map by Toorzee, a profile of the wall shows just how thin and 
steep the brick wall is, as can be seen in Figure 10. At about six feet wide, 
it is half the width of the walls of Hangwelle, a relatively small fort. 
The forts are mostly square with bastions for flanking 
fire, with some exceptions. The fort least in the shape 
one would expect of an early modern European fort is 
Hammenhiel, seen in Figure 11. Built by the 
Portuguese and taken by the Dutch in 1658, this 
“waterfort”137 is round and without bastions, lacking 
the polygonal shape typical of this tradition. It makes 
sense, however, if one looks at the shape of the small island it is built on. This is common 
among the forts Europeans built in Asia: the shape of the fort is in large part determined by the 
terrain it is built upon. This is evident from other examples on Sri Lanka as well. The largest 
fortress on the island, that of Galle, had its shape determined by the peninsula on which it was 
built, as affirmed by Nelson in his survey of Dutch forts on Sri Lanka and Lodewijk Wagenaar 
in his monograph.138  
                                                 
137 VOC 1604B 593r.  
138 Nelson, Dutch Forts of Sri Lanka 48.  
Figure 10 Profile of the 
walls of Batticaloa, as 
seen on Map 11. 
Figure 11 Hammenhiel, cropped version 
of Map 20. 
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De Heere and his companions deliberated with the commander of Jaffna, Hendrick 
Zwaardecroon on the necessity of Hammenhiel. Zwaardecroon had been acting Governor of 
Ceylon until De Heere took up the position and became Governor-General in 1718-1725. Their 
conclusion was that the fort had been built to defend against enemy ships, but that larger ships 
would not use the waterway Hammenhiel protected, as it was safer and more worthwhile for 
large (European) ships to land near Port Pedro or Jaffna. As such, they decided to abandon the 
fort.139 Evidently, whether the fort actually had any use against European ships was the main 
consideration. When it was concluded this was not the case, it was deemed to be “only a 
financial burden” to the Company.140  
The point of each of the fortifications was to serve a role in the defensive system on Sri 
Lanka. Odegard expresses this in a classification of forts which I find very convincing. Earlier 
classifications were often based on architectural premises, such as the classification by C.L. 
Temminck Groll of 1990 which counted the number of bastions and general shape of the 
forts.141 More recently, in 2000, R. van Oers approached fortification design from the field of 
town-planning, which he studied at the Technical University of Delft.142 The fundamental 
problem, Odegard states, is that form-based classifications do not necessarily make sense; 
Mannar and Castle Batavia have similar shapes, but are completely different in purpose. Gerrit 
Knaap, Henk den Heijer and Michiel de Jong use a classification based on the role of the forts 
within the wider system, using contemporary terms, but their classification is somewhat 
complicated and the reliance on contemporary terminology causes problems because they were 
not used consistently in the early modern period.143 
 
                                                 
139 VOC 1604B 593r.  
140 Ibidem. “het absolut voor d’E. Compa:e niet anders, dan een puire onnutte Last-post is”.  
141 C. L. Temminck Groll, ‘Vijf-vier-drie-twee-een: vanuit Nederland gestichte forten in andere werelddelen’, in: 
Jaarboek Stichting Menno van Coehoorn 1989/90 (Den Haag 1990) 103-120.  
142 Van Oers, Dutch Town Planning Overseas.  
143 The classification by these writers can be found in Knaap, Den Heijer and De Jong, Oorlogen overzee 232. 
Odegard’s commentary is found in Chapter 4 of Odegard, Unpublished Monograph.  
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Table 2 Odegard's typology of forts, altered to list the forts mapped by Toorzee as well as Colombo 
Type Role in system Examples in South Asia 
Fortress Main administrative and logistical 
center for region. Supports other 
fortifications in area  
Colombo, Galle, Jaffna 
1st tier forts  Maritime forts for control of trade-
routes and important nodal points in 
the trading network. 
Trincomalee, Manaar, Batticaloa, Matara, 
Negombo, Kalutara, Kalpitiya 
2nd tier forts  Protection of Company territory, 
production of trade goods and 
important tactical locations 
(protection of other forts, often also 
with a role in commerce control). 
Hammenhiel (protects Jaffna), Oostenburg 
(inner bay Trincomalee), Hangwelle 
(protects Colombo), Katuwana (protects 
Galle), Pijl (Jaffna), Beschutter (Jaffna), 
Elephant (Jaffna), Pooneryn (Jaffna) 
 
This classification by Odegard is useful because it shows the role of forts in the wider 
system, which might provide insights into why forts were treated in a certain way by De Heere. 
Hammenhiel, for example, is classified as a second tier fort with the main purpose of protecting 
Jaffna. De Heere did not think the fort actually fulfilled this purpose in a meaningful way, so it 
was abandoned. 
During the tenure of Van Goens and his son, especially near the end and also after their 
retirement and removal from office, criticisms were levelled at his system of fortification. Some 
of this was explored in Chapter 1. The most important problem identified with it was the sheer 
cost. An anonymous letter to the Directors in Amsterdam, cited by Odegard, cites the high costs 
and argues that the forts of Negombo, Kalatura, Trincomalee and Batticaloa were unnecessary, 
as a simple tower with a garrison of around forty men would be enough in those places. The 
reason for this, the writer claims, was that these towers would already be enough to signal to 
Europeans that they could not settle in these places, which was the only purpose the forts served 
anyway: they were not actually powerful enough to withstand a European siege, even with a 
small force of a few hundred men with proper artillery.144  
                                                 
144 Odegard, Unpublished Monograph Chapter 5.  
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This claim is valid, as Odegard 
agrees. The fortifications on Sri Lanka 
lack basic elements which would be 
required to defend against a strong 
European force. Interestingly, not one 
of the plans drawn by Toorzee shows 
a covered way or a glacis. Based on 
the plans in Nelson’s overview of 
Dutch forts on Sri Lanka, some of 
these forts do appear to have had a 
glacis at some point in their history, but it is not clear which would have existed in 1698. One 
example in particular is Kalutara, which Nelson shows to have a glacis on the southern side of 
the moat.145 Looking at the map by Toorzee in Figure 12, we see no glacis marked on the map, 
nor in the profile. The text mentions that the southern wall has been “rained out”, in the sense 
that the wall’s earthen part has washed out of the structure because of damage to the casing. A 
decision was reached to have this wall be repaired in the good monsoon, by stuffing the holes 
with stone and then plastering the wall anew with brick or coral stone. It appears that the fort 
was updated later to include a glacis and other improvements, but not at the time of De Heere’s 
inspection. One might speculate this change happened because of observations made in De 
Heere’s inspection, but the text shows no evidence of the lack of these improvements being 
noted and no proposal for them is made in the text or on the map. 
In the end, none of the fortresses was really tested until the late eighteenth century, when 
the garrisons often surrendered almost immediately.146 It seems, then, that Van Goens’ critics 
were right in their assertion that these forts would not resist European forces anyway. Perhaps 
                                                 
145 Nelson, Dutch Forts of Sri Lanka 32.  
146 Nelson, Dutch Forts of Sri Lanka passim. 
Figure 12 Detail of Map 4, showing the profile and the 
map with legend. 
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it is true that simple towers or smaller forts meant solely to defend against Kandy would have 
sufficed. On the other hand, it is reasonable to argue that the English, French and Portuguese 
never made a more concerted effort to take these forts because they would be hard to take, or 
at least hard enough that a relief force could cause trouble for the invaders.  
Dutch Fortifications on Sri Lanka: Purposes and Problems in De Heere’s time 
As part of the inspection journey Governor De Heere undertook, he inspected forts along the 
route. Table 3 shows the forts of which there are maps in the journal, divided into the month in 
which they were visited. Most of these inspections lasted around three days, including 
deliberations on what to do with it, usually ending up with personnel cuts as examined in 
Chapter 2. 
Table 3 Forts drawn by Toorzee 
Month Forts (date visited) 
April Negombo (1) 
May Kalutara (11) Galle (15) 
June Matara (7) 
July Batticaloa (3), Trincomale (7), Oostenburg (8), Jaffna (27) 
August - 
September Mannar (18), Kalpitiya (22) 
Not visited June: Katuwana 
September: Pijl, Beschutter, Eliphant, Pooneryn (September) 
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Not every fortification of which there is a map in the journal 
was actually visited by De Heere. For example, the party 
wanted to inspect the small forts shown on Figure 13 in 
September 1698, as well as Pomerijn, but because of an 
extreme drought, there was not enough fresh water along the 
way to provide for more than maybe five people. They also 
reference the irony that drought was preventing this visit in 
September, while in June they were unable to visit Katuwana 
because of heavy rainfall.147 It is unclear whether Toorzee 
actually went to these forts without Governor De Heere, but 
maps are added into the journal.  
As can be seen in Figure 14, there are puncture marks on 
the maps, which show on the scan as black dots. The 
punctures show that there is more than one of these maps, 
but it does not show whether the map in question is a copy 
or was copied. It is therefore hard to tell whether these maps 
in H47 and 1604B are merely copies of each other, or both 
copies of an entirely different map. One detail that favours 
the speculation that Toorzee did visit these forts is the dates on the maps in the month of June. 
This contrasts with Map 9 of Katuwana, which is dated in late October after the journey was 
completed.   
It is obvious from De Heere’s journal that the consensus by the end of the seventeenth 
century was that these fortifications were costly and while they had to be maintained, costs 
should be reduced as much as possible. As mentioned above, some forts were abandoned or the 
                                                 
147 VOC 1604B 592. 
Figure 13 Map 18, showing the 
small forts Pijl, Beschutter and 
Eliphant 
Figure 14 Detail of the back of 
Map 19, fol. 390v. 
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garrisons were reduced significantly. The four forts mentioned in the previous paragraph which 
also serve to protect Jaffna were deemed more important than Hammenhiel, but not important 
enough to have Europeans garrison them. Instead, lascorins would be used to man the forts of 
Pijl, Beschutter and Eliphant. On the other hand, Pooneryn protected an important road and was 
in a reasonable condition. The fact that Pooneryn is depicted on a separate map from the other 
three might illustrate that it was held in higher regard by De Heere. After all, why would such 
a small fort be given its own sheet, when the other three of similar size share a map?   
Despite most forts being deemed unimportant enough to have their garrison reduced, there 
was an acknowledgement that they could not simply be abandoned or even demolished. When 
discussing the forts in the bay of Trincomalee, the text mentions that it would be very expensive 
to demolish the forts with gunpowder and carrying the remnants into the sea. If the forts were 
not demolished, other Europeans could move in, which would be a problem because the bay 
was an excellent anchorage. Also, if they did and the next king of Kandy would be less friendly 
to the Dutch, it could cause larger problems in the sense of a European-Kandyan alliance. 
Besides: Europeans might do so even if the forts were demolished. Therefore, a watch tower 
would have to be built instead with at least a small garrison, to “show, and protect [the 
Company’s] right and possession, of these lands”.148  
As mentioned before, Toorzee does not show glacises or covered ways on any of his 
fortification plans. If they did not exist, it calls into question whether the designs were ever 
meant to defend against a proper European force. On the other hand, perhaps Toorzee would 
not have shown them even if they existed, as the purpose of these forts was not necessarily to 
defend against Europeans anyway at the end of the seventeenth century. Therefore, Toorzee 
had little motivation to show on the maps that these forts could in fact withstand such a siege. 
The maps seem to primarily show the layout of the forts and specifically always show where 
                                                 
148 VOC 1604B 533r. “tot betoningh, en bewaringh van haer recht en possessie, deser landen”.  
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the warehouses are. On the map of Kalatura, shown in Figure 12, the only buildings marked 
and explained in the legend are the warehouses. Similarly, the visitation of Negombo yields 
Map 2, which shows the fortifications in place and the plans for an expansion. When 
deliberating on whether the fort should be kept, De Heere concludes that the fort is useful to 
protect the cinnamon warehouses located within the walls. The costs for keeping the fort to 
“show the Company’s possession” would be rather low, because only a small garrison was 
needed.149 So small, in fact, that a large portion of the current garrison is removed, as happens 
so often in this inspection trip.  
On Map 6, depicting Galle, only 
the VOC buildings are marked in 
black, with the important ones 
described. The letters on the map only 
indicate the bastions though, except for 
projected new buildings marked in red. 
These buildings, depicted on Figure 
15, consist of multiple warehouses, a 
carpentry workshop with another small 
warehouse, and a “corpsduguarde”. Storage space was apparently needed and this rather large 
map is made primarily to show the state of the fortifications and the location of the new places 
for this storage space. Besides the storage space being added, there was also a problem with the 
moat: It proved difficult to bring enough water to it for it to be functional for defence. As one 
of the most important forts on the island, De Heere was prepared to undergo a project to solve 
this. Figure 16 shows two designs by Toorzee. The top left shows a way to stop dirt from 
flowing into the stream on a nearby mountain. The rest of the map shows the river Gindere to 
                                                 
149 VOC 1604B 226v “tot betoningh van de Ed. Comps. posessie”. 
Figure 15 Detail of Map 6, showing the proposed 
buildings in red: O carpentry workshop, P: warehouse 
for commercial goods, Q: equipment warehouse, R: 
corpsduguarde. 
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the city of Galle as it was in 1695, with instructions on how to improve the situation by digging 
a canal to bring the water to Galle. This example shows that De Heere wished to reduce costs, 
but not where forts were important enough for the defence of Dutch interests in Sri Lanka.  
 
Still, Galle is an exception. As the other examples have shown, the main goal in regards to 
fortifications for De Heere’s inspection was to cut costs, while maintaining the forts with the 
purpose of protecting the VOC’s commercial interests on Sri Lanka. This was evidently not 
considered to require large garrisons and extensive fortifications in most cases. The phrase “tot 
betoningh van de Compagnie’s possessie”, or in English “to display the Company’s possession” 
is used very often. This signifies that in De Heere’s time, unlike when Van Goens drove policy 
on Sri Lanka, fortifications were primarily meant to show the land belonged to the Dutch, rather 
than actually physically defending it. The forts, then, become a symbol of occupation rather 
than a means.  
Only one of the four policy points mentioned in Chapter 1 has not been discussed yet in 
this chapter: maintaining the peace with Kandy. One of the critics of Van Goens, Joost 
Segenaar, captain of the army at Colombo, argued that one of the main problems with Van 
Goens’ system of fortification was his hostile policy towards Kandy, as a European force was 
sure to find an ally shortly after landing on one of the many unprotected beaches. As discussed 
in Chapter 1 and evidenced in Chapter 2, policy towards Kandy had shifted into one of 
reverence for the purposes of peace, so that Kandy would leave the Dutch alone.  
 Figure 16 Map 7, depicting a possible method of sluicing water to the moat of Galle. 
62 
 
In June 1698, Governor De Heere visits Matara, built by the Portuguese in 1595 and 
captured in 1640, then rebuilt to Dutch specifications in 1645. De Heere is somewhat 
contradictory in his opinion on the fort. On the one hand, the text mentions that besides the 
principal fortresses of Colombo, Galle and Jaffna, most forts on Sri Lanka are not very useful. 
This in large part because it has been proven that a more effective policy is to “endeavour to 
stay with the king of Kandy, and to live, in a good genuine friendship without animosity”.150 
Hostilities have “rarely brought benefits, but have brought millions of treasury damage and 
costs” and therefore the governor found the pursuit of friendship on Ceylon “the utmost point 
for conservation of peace”.151 On the other hand, the fort itself had been proven to be sufficient 
for the protection of the cinnamon production at its location. The conclusion was that, as it had 
been sufficient so far, it did not have to be upgraded and its garrison could even be reduced to 
drive down costs.152 This shows three of the main policy points: peace with Kandy must be 
maintained, commerce and especially the cinnamon trade must be protected, but costs must be 
reduced where possible.  
Based on the results of De Heere’s visitations of these forts it is evident that attitudes 
changed in the late seventeenth century. Whereas Rijckloff van Goens attempted to create a 
system of forts with which to subdue Kandy and create a territorial VOC which could defend 
this island from European attacks, De Heere’s focus was on reducing costs as much as possible 
while maintaining the ability to protect commerce on the island. Still, Van Goens’ impact is 
still visible in quite a literal sense: his fort system was so extensive and so central to the shifting 
VOC policies that more than half of the maps in the journal focus on forts.  
  
                                                 
150 VOC 1604B 497r, “verre best is te betragten met den Coninck van Candia te blijven, en te leven, in een goede 
opregte vrindschap sonder geveijnstheijt.” 
151 Ibidem. “selden voordeel, maar wel millioenen schats schaden, en oncosten toegebraght heeft”, “het opperste 
poinct tot conservatie vande rust.” 
152 VOC 1604B 497v.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis posed a number of interrelated questions. It asked what the purpose was of Governor 
Gerrit de Heere’s inspection of Ceylon, how it related to wider VOC policies and what the role 
of the maps in the journal was in this. It also questioned whether this journal could show the 
changing position of the VOC on the merchant-state spectrum in the late seventeenth century. 
Chapter 1 showed that the VOC’s position was changing in the late seventeenth century; the 
increasing competition from other Europeans and the decreasing prices meant the VOC had to 
reconfigure. Investment in Asia increased, but costs had to be cut where possible. On Sri Lanka 
specifically, Van Goens’ insistence on territorial ambitions was no longer accepted as policy 
by the Directors and Batavia. Instead, the VOC endeavoured to maintain friendly relations with 
the king of Kandy in an effort to protect commerce on the island, which was their main focus. 
This commerce had to be protected from Europeans, but with costs reduced where possible. 
This is reflected in the journal of De Heere. As elucidated in Chapter 2, the text concerns 
two categories of activities. The daily activities of governance are covered and show a focus on 
commercial activities, particularly the elephant trade. The communications with the King of 
Kandy present in the journal also provide evidence of the policy to maintain the peace with that 
kingdom. The actual inspections done by De Heere and his party focused on maintaining the 
position the VOC had where possible but reducing costs as much as could be done. These cuts 
were particularly focused on personnel costs, with the native employees being laid off in most 
places. This is evidence that the policy points introduced in Chapter 1 are being followed and 
supports the idea that the VOC was moving closer to the mercantile side of the state-merchant 
spectrum.  
In Chapter 3 we see that there had recently been an update to the land registry in Jaffna. 
This change was meant to increase the revenues from the land the VOC administered, as well 
as to redress unfair registration and alleviate the plight of the poor members of society. It is in 
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these reports by Toorzee that maps play a very prominent role: they illustrate the deficiencies 
of the local, native land surveyors. By showing how distorted their maps of the land were, 
Toorzee intended to convince his superiors that the new registry was deficient. The conclusions 
drawn from the report are indicative of the wider message of this inspection journey. It would 
be admirable to properly map out the land registry, but it would require European surveyors, 
which is too expensive.  
This tells us that the VOC officials on Ceylon are focusing on increasing revenue to 
alleviate the declining income of the VOC. On the other hand, they are unwilling to actually 
invest in this project with proper land surveys done by expensive European surveyors. 
Generating revenue through land is a typical state activity – and one of the primary means Van 
Goens proposed to make Ceylon profitable – so the unwillingness to commit to this shows once 
more that the VOC was moving closer to the mercantile part of the spectrum. 
The other maps examined in this chapter, the overview maps, are the opposite of the land 
survey maps in function: they are almost entirely decorative. They show the places Governor 
De Heere visited, but do not illustrate any arguments made. The purpose of these maps appears 
to be to give a sense of location for the reader. This does not mean they are randomly chosen 
or convey nothing of meaning. Providing a sense of location to the reader in this case means 
providing a sense of possession. The officials who would be reading this journal would be 
primed a certain way by seeing these maps. In a way, these maps are added to the journal “tot 
betoningh van de Compagnie’s possessie”, much like the forts in the physical world do. The 
point is that these maps display possession, even if they do not directly support an argument 
made in the text.  
In Chapter 4 it became evident that the ambitions of Van Goens were no longer in fashion 
on Sri Lanka. The fortifications were generally speaking not up to date and most likely unable 
to hold off a determined European force. The comments on the fortifications in the text showed 
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as much; Hammenhiel for example was recommended to be abandoned because it was only 
useful against large ships, and Europeans would not be bothered by it anyway.  
In this case, again, the maps are illustrative. They show the layout of the fortifications and 
provide evidence, sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit, of the deficiencies. The lack of 
proper measures against European style sieges, such as covered ways, is clear to anyone who 
has knowledge of fortification building.  
Perhaps less obvious is the focus on warehouses shown on the maps. In this sense, the 
fortification maps show the focus on commercial activity over territorial ambition of the VOC 
at this time. As mentioned in the introduction, it is my opinion that the VOC moved around on 
a spectrum between merchant and state. This journal shows that in the time of De Heere, the 
VOC on Ceylon was firmly in the merchant camp, or at least intended to be. In actual fact, it 
held and managed territory, had soldiers and fortifications and conducted diplomacy with a 
king. It is vital that more studies are conducted to examine more of these journals to see if this 
attitude changes over the next few decades, especially seeing as hostilities increased again and 
culminated in war in 1736.  
All in all, then, the inspection journey of Governor De Heere was primarily meant to reduce 
costs. The other policy points of the VOC are evidently part of his considerations, but the 
measures actually implemented amount mostly to cutting costs, especially in personnel. Within 
this purpose, the overview maps are decorative and the fortification and land survey maps play 
illustrative roles. This tells us that the Dutch officials on Sri Lanka, including De Heere, saw 
the VOC as belonging on the merchant end of the state-merchant spectrum. The decisions made 
by De Heere in this journal show us that he actively worked to align Ceylon’s policies and 
position to reflect this.  
It seems to me that this is the reason for the gaps in the historiography, too. Van Goens’ 
period is well-covered because the Dutch were actively state building under his leadership. In 
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the 1720s this starts picking up again, and the historiography becomes more detailed, but in the 
period in between, a lacuna exists. A period of mercantile focus, in which the Dutch mostly 
kept the political boundaries between Kandy and their possessions at a status quo is apparently 
less exciting for historians. I suspect this is not unusual for many places and periods in history, 
change is simply easier to write a compelling narrative about. Of course, this thesis has shown 
that there certainly was a change in this period, but the change is behind the curtains, in the 
machinery of the VOC, while the vehicle was parked and seemed to stand still on Sri Lanka. 
There were no shifting boundaries, so the map of Dutch possessions does not change, but the 
reality these maps reflected certainly did.  
This thesis has also shown that these journals can tell us much about the way the Dutch 
looked at their governance of Sri Lanka. The benefit of examining these inspections as opposed 
to the normal daily registers, or dagregisters, is that the Governor is actively reflecting on the 
possessions of the VOC and their merits. These kinds of reflections are present in the 
dagregisters as well, but they are spread out more than in these relatively compact journals. I 
have not focused on the reflective quality of this journal, but researchers focusing on the 
attitudes of the Governors of Sri Lanka could definitely use this journal and others like it. 
As I mentioned in the introduction, cartographic material is underutilized in history writing. 
Hopefully my examinations here have shown the possibilities. It is especially when maps are 
illustrative that one can glean attitudes of VOC officials from them, as well as reflections of 
VOC policies. In a sense, then, they can find a second life as illustrative objects, but this time 
for the arguments of current historians.  
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Appendix – Cartographic Material in De Heere’s Journal 
Below you will find the cartographic material present in the journal of De Heere. For all but 
one map, they are taken from the National Archives copy of the journal. Some notes must be 
made. The maps are presented in the order they occur in the journal. I have decided to add them 
here as large as an A4 sheet of paper allows while maintaining their aspect ratios. I have added 
the size of the maps in real life, measured as the height and width of the paper sheet on which 
they were drawn, accurate to half a centimetre. I have included the original title where present, 
followed by my own English title in italics. These English titles include the modern names for 
locations where relevant.  
 VOC 1604B was digitized for the National Archives by the Belastingdienst. Because 
there was a miscommunication about there being cartographic material in this journal, there 
were no allowances for the larger maps. As such, the people who scanned these maps could not 
get the larger maps onto one scan and did it in parts. I have used image manipulation software 
to “sew” these together, but because of rotations of the maps and slightly different angles of the 
photos, some graphical errors persist. These should not affect interpretations of the maps 
however. In the case of map 14, of the bays of Trincomalee, the way the map was folded was 
apparently too difficult to properly scan. As such, I have been forced to use the map from H47, 
the Leiden copy, instead. The other maps which I have sewn together are: 
 Map 6 Gale 
 Map 7 Spruijt 
 Map 12 Trincomalee 
 Map 16 Jaffna 
II 
 
  
Map 1 “Kaart der Colombese Landen”, Map of the District Colombo , 40.5 cm × 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 228. 
Rotated 90° counter-clockwise.  
III 
 
 
Map 2 “Tegenwoordig gestalte van de vijvhoek aan de schans tot Nigombo ”, Fort Negombo,               
51.5 cm × 30.5 cm, VOC 1604B folio 229. Rotated 90° counter-clockwise. 
IV 
 
  
Map 3 “'t Fort Hangwelle”, Fort Hangwelle, 50.5 cm × 32.5 cm, VOC 1604B folio 236. Rotated 
90° counter-clockwise. 
V 
 
  
Map 4 "'T Fort Calleture", Fort Kalutara, 40 cm × 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 243. 
VI 
 
  
Map 5 "Kaart van het Commandement Gale", District of Gale, 42 cm × 32 cm, VOC 1604B folio 450. 
Rotated 90° counter-clockwise. 
VII 
 
  
Map 6 "Gale", Gale, 101 cm × 73 cm, VOC 1604B folio 451. Rotated 90° counter-
clockwise. 
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Map 9 "Katoene", Fort Katuwana, 45.5 cm × 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 507. Rotated 90° counter-
clockwise. 
XI 
 
  
Map 10 "Kaarte waarinne vertoont wert, hoeverre de forten Batticaloa en Tricoenmale van malkander leggen", 
Overview of the distance between Batticaloa and Trincomale , 41.5 cm × 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 521.  
XII 
 
  
Map 11 "'T Fort Batticaloa", Fort Batticaloa, 48 cm × 32.5 cm, VOC 1604B folio 522. Rotated 90° 
counter-clockwise. 
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Map 13 "'T Fort Oostenburg", Fort Oostenburg, 45 cm × 32.5 cm, VOC 1604B folio 530. Rotated 
90° counter-clockwise. 
XV 
 
  
Map 14 "Baaij van Tricoenmale", Bay of Trincomale, 100 cm × 75 cm, H47 no page number.  In VOC 
1604B this map is on folio 531. Rotated 90° counter-clockwise. 
XVI 
 
  
Map 15 "Landkaart van Iajjanapatnam ende tlandschap Wanny", Overview of Jaffna and Wanny ,                  
71.5 cm × 53 cm, VOC 1604B folio 536. Rotated 90° counter -clockwise. 
XVII 
 
  Map 16 "Iaffanapatnam", Jaffna, 72.5 cm × 52 cm, VOC 1604B folio 545.  
XVIII 
 
  
Map 17 Land Survey Map attached to Toorzee's report , 40 cm × 32.5 cm, unfoliated, between VOC 1604B 
folios 560 and 561. 
XIX 
 
  
Map 18 Forts Pijl, Beschutter and Eliphant , 40 × 33, VOC 1604B folio 589. 
XX 
 
  
Map 19 "Ponnerijn", Fort Pooneryn, 30 cm × 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 590. 
XXI 
 
  
Map 20 "Hammenhiel", Fort Hammenhiel, 35 cm × 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 591.  
XXII 
 
  
Map 21 "Vebeelding van de Tank van Catchij", The Tank of Kachchai, 40 cm × 33 cm, unfoliated, between 
VOC 1604B folios 596 and 597. 
XXIII 
 
  
Map 22 "Manaar", Fort Mannar, 27 cm × 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 602.  
XXIV 
 
 
Map 23 "Calpentijn", Fort Kalpitiya, 23.5 cm × 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 606. 
